Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games: a meta study

Fiala, Lenka; Suetens, Sigrid

doi:10.1007/s10683-017-9517-4

Cited by 43 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(27 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For each of these studies we select the following variables, according to existing surveys (Ledyard [1995], Chaudhuri [2011]) and meta-studies on contribution decisions in linear public goods games (Croson and Marks [2000], Zelmer [2003] and Fiala and Suetens [2017]):…”

Section: Meta-analysis Of Cooperation Under Endogenous and Exogenous mentioning

confidence: 99%

Group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A survey and meta-analytic evidence

Guido

Robbett

Romaniuc

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games: public goods games, common pool resources, and the prisoner's dilemma. The 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms-endogenous, endogenous with the option to play the game, and exogenous-on cooperation rates. Our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free-riders, independently of the sorting mechanism. We complement the survey with a meta-analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting. What is more, we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like-minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups. These observations are related. As we show in the survey, the success of a sorting method in matching like-minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked. * For valuable insights at various stages of this work, we wish to thank Rachel Croson, Fabrice Le Lec, Marie-Claire Villeval and the participants at the IMEBESS meeting in Barcelona, the ASFEE meeting in Rennes, and at the Cooperation: Interdisciplinary Methods Workshop in Lille. We are also grateful to the authors who responded to our various requests on the ESA forum.

show abstract

Section: Meta-analysis Of Cooperation Under Endogenous and Exogenous mentioning

confidence: 99%

Group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A survey and meta-analytic evidence

Guido

Robbett

Romaniuc

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…On the other hand, Bigoni and Suetens (2012), Sell and Wilson (1991) and Nikiforakis (2010) find that providing information on individual contributions increases cooperation in comparison to similar scenarios with aggregate or no information. 19 For reasons of statistical power, the single most important source for our behavioral hypothesis that HA will lead to higher contributions than LA is a recent meta-analysis by Fiala and Suetens (2017) . They review 71 studies on voluntary contribution mechanisms (and 18 studies on collusion in oligopoly settings) and find that individual information on contributions "tends to lead to an increase in contributions" ( Fiala and Suetens, 2017 , p. 755).…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Personal accountability and cooperation in teams

Sonntag

Zizzo

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a real effort lab and online team production experiment, we analyze exerted effort under different conditions of individual accountability. In a repeated setting, we vary the degree to which production can be directly traced back to a collaborator's individual or randomly drawn effort level, respectively. We find that individuals produce much less and the decline of effort over time is significantly steeper under high as compared to low and endogenously chosen personal accountability. While endogenous accountability provides an option for monitoring others, it does not force subjects to learn about their underperforming peers, thus limiting the typical decline of contributions over time. We conclude that accountability one step removed may be an interesting institutional setting for repeated collaborations in contexts where low accountability for political, social or legal reasons is not a viable option.

show abstract

“…They also find that male-male interactions are more co-operative than female-female interactions and that women co-operate more in mixed interactions. Fiala and Suetens (2017) focus on the role of feedback in public goods and oligopoly games. By contrast, Balliet et al (2011) do not analyse how gender differences are mediated by risk and temptation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zelmer (2003) focuses on the linear public good game and finds that returns as well as framing, communication, partner matchings and the use of children as subjects had a positive effect on co-operation. Fiala and Suetens (2017) focus on the role of feedback in public goods and oligopoly games. results.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk and Temptation: A Meta‐study on Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Mengel

2017

The Economic Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article reports the results of a meta-study of 96 prisoner's dilemma studies comprising more than 3,500 participants. I disentangle the role of 'risk' (to co-operate unilaterally) and 'temptation' (to defect against a co-operator) and find that: (i) an index of risk best explains the variation in cooperation rates across one-shot games, while (ii) an index of temptation best explains the variation in finitely repeated games. Risk and temptation indices also affect gender comparisons. Women are more co-operative than the average man if risk is low and less co-operative if risk is high. There are no gender differences on average. 2 Andreoni and Croson (2008) summarise some of the research on the 'partner' versus 'stranger' question in a handbook article on the public good game. In the prisoner's dilemma Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Cooper et al. (1996) found more co-operation in the 'partner' condition, Boone et al. (1999) found no difference and Andreoni (1988) found more co-operation in the stranger setting. Boone et al. (1999) find more co-operation in the 'partner' condition with a long horizon in the repeated game and no difference with a short horizon of the repeated game. See also the more detailed discussion of differences between these papers in Section 4. Most articles on the prisoner's dilemma I found do not contain data on both the 'partner' and the 'stranger' case. The findings on gender are consistent with evidence in Simpson (2003), who argues precisely that the reason why existing literature on the prisoner's dilemma has, by and large, not found gender differences is because of the presence of both temptation and risk in these games (Kuwabara, 2006). 3 To the extent that communication reduces strategic uncertainty, this could explain for example why preplay communication is often found to increase co-operation rates in these settings (see e.g. the meta study of Balliet, 2010or Ledyard, 1995and Chaudhury, 2011 for surveys on the related public good game). Other examples of interventions designed to reduce temptation could include taxation schemes, with very progressive schemes better suited to curb temptation compared to linear schemes.

show abstract

Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games: a meta study

Cited by 43 publications

References 28 publications

Group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A survey and meta-analytic evidence

Group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A survey and meta-analytic evidence

Personal accountability and cooperation in teams

Risk and Temptation: A Meta‐study on Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About