Transnational Terrorist Recruitment: Evidence from Daesh Personnel Records

Abstract

Global terrorist organizations attract radicalized individuals across borders and constitute a threat for both sending and receiving countries. We use unique personnel records from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) to show that unemployment in sending countries is associated with the number of transnational terrorist recruits from these countries. The relationship is spatially heterogeneous, which is most plausibly attributable to travel costs. We argue that poor labor market opportunities generally push more individuals to join terrorist organizations, but at the same time limit their ability to do so when longer travel distances imply higher migration costs.

A Theoretical Treatment of Foreign Fighters and Terrorism

“…Although there is a rich empirical literature on factors affecting foreign fighters' decision to emigrate abroad to bolster terrorist or rebel groups (e.g., Benmelech and Klor 2020;Brockmeyer et al 2023;Edgerton 2023;Hegghammer 2013;Humphreys and Weinstein 2008;Kalyvas and Kocher 2007), there is no formal theoretical foundation that can identify key parameters that affect the decision of potential foreign fighters to go abroad and exert effort. In particular, we do not know how the source-country labor market or radicalization affects the emigration decisions or would-be foreign fighters.…”

“…Terrorist volunteers from a foreign nation (where there is little or no scope for terrorism) join the activities of a terror group abroad and fight against the domestic or host government there. For example, fighters from Western Europe emigrated to Syria and Iraq to enlist in ISIS (Benmelech and Klor 2020;Brockmeyer et al 2023). So-called Western Jihadists may prefer a foreign venue for a number of reasons -e.g., fewer counterterrorism measures abroad, the ability to gain training, a preference for the foreign venue, greater camaraderie, or attractive inducements (Hegghammer 2013;Humphreys and Weinstein 2008;Kalyvas and Kocher 2007;Soules 2023).…”

“…A major issue in the literature in this area has been to consider how source-country labor market prospects (wage or unemployment rate) may affect the supply of foreign fighters (see, e.g., Benmelech and Klor 2020;Braithwaite and Chu 2018;Brockmeyer et al 2023;Edgerton 2023;Hanson 2021;Soules 2023;Verwimp 2016). In our framework,  is the expected wage in the source nation representing potential foreign fighters' opportunity cost, so that a rise in  reflects improved labor market conditions there from enhanced employment (i.e., a fall in source-country unemployment rate).…”

“…The absence of an underlying formal theoretical model means that disparate empirical results cannot be easily explained or attributed to different causes. For example, some empirical studies find that economic considerations such as source-country unemployment can support the decision of fighters to go abroad (e.g., Benmelech and Klor 2020;Verwimp 2016), while other empirical studies do not necessarily link this unemployment to the decision of fighters to emigrate (Brockmeyer et al 2023;Edgerton 2023).…”

Incentives and constraints: a configurational account of European involvement in the anti-Daesh coalition

“…This literature emphasizes that decisions about military deployments are often dependent upon structural and procedural restrictions, and that parliaments are important actors also in security policy, particularly, but not exclusively, when legislatures hold a formal veto right over military missions (Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010;Oktay, 2018;Coticchia and Moro, 2020). While mandatory parliamentary involvement can also yield 5 On the economic drivers of Daesh's recruitment of foreign fighters, see Brockmeyer et al (2018). The role of women in Daesh is analyzed in Loken and Zelenz (2017).…”