Translating Legal Rights into Tenure Security: Lessons from the New Commercial Pressures on Land in Ghana

Abstract

Since the confluence of the food and oil price crises of the mid 2000s, Ghana has become a prime destination for large-scale farmland investments. While this trend could make valuable contributions to an ailing agricultural sector, the alienation of rural land for commercial ends could conversely have far-reaching implications for customary land rights. Through an analysis of the legislation protecting customary land rights and governing such the alienation of those rights and by contrasting this with practice, this article highlights some of the fundamental challenges in translating legal rights into tenure security in contemporary Ghana. It shows that despite the legal recognition of customary land rights, in practice customary land users are ultimately responsible for contesting infringements upon these rights. With traditional authorities able to capture substantial rents from the alienation process and government institutions offering scant oversight as a result of fragmented responsibilities, capacity constraints, and political disincentive, the protection of customary land rights is becoming increasingly contingent on community 'capacity to claim'. Since poor access to information, unrealistic expectations and deference to traditional authority tends to quell disputes over alienation, the limited mechanisms for protecting citizen access to resources gives reason to reconsider the importance of direct state involvement in the customary land domain.

Dynamics of community perceptions, common resources and compensation practices in mining: the case of Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd at Ahafo

“…That notwithstanding, how these land rights are protected regarding expropriation and compensation for the expropriated has been questioned (Ayitey et al 2011;Shoneveld and German 2014). For example, though legislation requires compensation for expropriated land rights to be fair, adequate and promptly paid; these adjectives are normative value judgments predicated on stakeholders' perceptions and no standards exist for compliance.…”

Biofuel development in Ghana: policies of expansion and drivers of failure in the jatropha sector

“…In terms of viability, a recent study shows that the majority of biofuel projects collapse within the first 5 years of operation [75]. In the case of Ghana, out of the 9 verified abandoned jatropha projects for which we could establish a date of collapse, 5 failed in the first 3 years and the remaining failed within the first 5 years of operation.…”

“…In the first case (BioFuel Africa, Yendi), the negative role played by chieftaincy had to do with the unfair sharing of benefits, weak leadership, and abuse of authority. The absence of regulators (intermediaries, observers, and even formal promoters) is common to such land acquisition processes, and can expose it to iniquitous and exploitative conduct by local chiefs [75]. Consequently, such projects suffer from the lack of transparency, accountability, and trust, as the traditional authorities in Ghana often refuse to disclose contract terms for fear that others will demand to share the benefits [75].…”

“…The absence of regulators (intermediaries, observers, and even formal promoters) is common to such land acquisition processes, and can expose it to iniquitous and exploitative conduct by local chiefs [75]. Consequently, such projects suffer from the lack of transparency, accountability, and trust, as the traditional authorities in Ghana often refuse to disclose contract terms for fear that others will demand to share the benefits [75]. This self-interest of chieftaincy and traditional authority institutions has created a new political space for elite capture, and raises questions about their effectiveness of being good custodians of land in Ghana [8][75] [114].…”

‘With those views, you should work for the Communist Party of China’: challenging Western knowledge production on China-Africa relations

“…China also has a growing urban class and the government proactively seeks new markets for its traders and producers. All of this is seen by critics as a resource 'grab' utilising Africa's cheap and suitably abundant land in a manner replicating the political and economic conditions of the 19 th Century (Berthoud, 2010;Cheru and Modi, 2013;Escobar, 2008;Sachs, 2010;Schoneveld and German, 2014;Steger and Roy, 2010;Taylor, 2014;Wang and Zou, 2014). China, from this perspective, is considered to be re-establishing relations of centre/periphery -the essence of colonial and imperial economics -by taking primary commodities and returning manufactured goods at considerably higher costs (Escobar, 2008;Harvey, 2005;Rodney, 2012;Sidaway, 2002;Taylor, 2014).…”