Transitioning From Endgame to Sustainability

Abstract

This article engages with Peter Barnes’s work on commons trusts as a model to confront mounting social and ecological crises. The authors begin by locating Barnes’s model within the context of other approaches to this issue and by describing the main elements of his work and applying them to the case of carbon reduction strategies. Throughout, the article highlights the key strengths, limitations, and implications of Barnes’s model. Although Barnes offers a proposal for institutional change that could democratize decision making with a view to protecting the ecosphere, it does not go far enough to challenge the current capitalist order or in explaining how commons trusts would be protected from corporate influence. Implications include the connections between Barnes’s institutional model and a confederal model of global governance, as well as the potential of commons trusts to alter the practice of law and create new channels for ecological literacy and grassroots activism.

How Do Money and Time Restrictions Influence Self-Constraining Behavior in Polluting the Commons?

“…This situation was designed as an analogue to open access management of commons (Brownlee & Kueneman, 2012). Both dilemma type (traditional/consumption vs. reverse/disposal) and cost (money vs. time) were manipulated using scripts.…”

“…Scientists have identified a list of boundaries beyond which planetary systems are unreliable and most involve global commons such as atmospheric carbon, ocean acidification, ozone depletion, global freshwater, and chemical pollution (Hoffman & Jennings, 2015). Unfortunately, research on commons management indicates that such global commons are the most difficult to use sustainably (e.g., Berkes, 2009;Brownlee & Kueneman, 2012;Feeny, Berkes, McKay, & Acheson, 1990). Hardin (1968) suggested that commons are difficult to manage sustainably because of economic rationality: An individual using the commons beyond their share of the resource's capacity (e.g., overfishing) retains all of the profit from their additional use while the cost (e.g., reduction of breeding capacity below replacement) is shared by all users.…”

“…Scientists have identified a list of boundaries beyond which planetary systems are unreliable and most involve global commons such as atmospheric carbon, ocean acidification, ozone depletion, global freshwater, and chemical pollution (Hoffman & Jennings, 2015). Unfortunately, research on commons management indicates that such global commons are the most difficult to use sustainably (e.g., Berkes, 2009; Brownlee & Kueneman, 2012; Feeny, Berkes, McKay, & Acheson, 1990).…”

“…However, subsequent research indicates that many commons, of diverse types and global locations, are sustainably managed by unregulated groups (Berkes, 2009; Brownlee & Kueneman, 2012; Feeny et al, 1990; Ostrom et al, 2002; Pretty, 2003). Most of these studies indicate that such management relies strongly on social norms and sanctions among the users of the commons.…”

Goal Framing in Public Issue and Action Decisions

“…Specifically, most loss aversion research investigates personal choices, ones that would directly impact the chooser, such as preferred investments or health treatments (e.g., Weber, Blais, & Betz, ). However, at least in democratic countries, many important decisions involve public or collective resources––things we share such as public institutions, infrastructure, and the natural environment (e.g., Brownlee & Kueneman, ). The purpose of the present study was to examine whether a loss frame impacts decisions about public resources and actions in addition to more personal decisions.…”