Transforming the Soviet Sphere of Influence? U.S.-Soviet Détente and Eastern Europe, 1969-1976

Selvage, Douglas

doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00804.x

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The strategy of "linkage" that Nixon/Kissinger pursued towards the U.S.S.R. entailed compromise and accepting, tacitly, Soviet primacy in Eastern Europe in return for concessions in Vietnam. 104 The exploratory Balkan micro-détente did not have the vigor to survive a world oil crisis in 1973, or the onset of the slow death of superpower détente when its overhyped aims encountered the Yom Kippur War, political upheaval in Italy, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. These events combined to reveal the limitations of superpower détente as a process, its haphazard arrangements, and its crude treatment of volatile areas such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East.…”

Section: Communist World"mentioning

confidence: 99%

The United States, Differentiation, and Balkan Cooperation during the Cold War

Pedaliu¹

2022

zeitgeschichte

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To reject it in favour of a deliberately evasive and opaque geographical term like Southeastern Europe, could promote the stereotypes it intends to avoid as well as ahistorical approaches to the study of the region and in the long run, historical amnesia. 5 II.The Legacy of WWII Liberation found Balkan societies deeply divided and seeking divergent political futures.Total war, collaboration, resistance and survival had become intertwined with pre-existing disputes and regional competition. Nazi Germany's and Fascist Italy's conquests were accompanied by energetic occupations through the "puppet" governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania and had created a combustible security environment. The Soviet Union's success in pushing Hitler' armies westward appealed to popular mood in the occupied Balkans more than the slower-moving Anglo-American strategy that aimed to divert Nazi Germany away from reinforcing the shores of France. 6 Allied "grand strategy" in the Balkans was experienced as a clamp that increased the ferocity of occupation, intensified disunity and bifurcated local resistance into communist and anti-communist groupings. It bred frustration and fostered suspicion. The cynicism evinced by the Stalin-Churchill percentages agreement in 1944 anticipated a future based on division. 7 It also revealed that American opposition to spheres of influence was flexible. In Athens, the December Events demonstrated that Britain, starved of the resources it needed to finance its postwar strategy, could resort to heavy-handedness to avert Communist takeovers. 8 In the Balkans, the shape of peace had

show abstract

Section: Communist World"mentioning

confidence: 99%

The United States, Differentiation, and Balkan Cooperation during the Cold War

Pedaliu¹

2022

zeitgeschichte

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

The United States and the NATO Non-extension Assurances of 1990: New Light on an Old Problem?

Trachtenberg

2021

International Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Russian government has claimed that the Western powers promised at the end of the Cold War not to expand NATO, but later reneged on that promise. Most former officials in the West, and many scholars as well, have denied that this was the case; but other scholars, along with a handful of former officials, believe that promises to that effect were, in fact, made in 1990. So who is right? The question still has political importance: how it is answered has bearing on how we should feel about NATO expansion and, indeed, about the United States' post–Cold War policy more generally. So it makes sense to stand back and try to see where the truth lies. An examination of the debate in light of the evidence—especially evidence that the participants themselves have presented—leads to the conclusion that the Russian allegations are by no means baseless, which affects how the U.S.-Russian relationship today is to be understood.

show abstract

Ostpolitik: Transformation through Communication and the Quest for Peaceful Change

Niedhart

2016

Journal of Cold War Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Ostpolitik during the era of Willy Brandt signaled a new departure in West German foreign policy. At first a latecomer in European détente, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) became its pacemaker. With respect to both security matters and economic relations, the FRG emerged as the main partner of the Soviet Union in Europe. Starting from the international context, the article analyzes the dynamic that emanated from the formula Wandel durch Annäherung (change through rapprochement). The focus is on (1) perceptions and short-term objectives, (2) underlying assumptions and expectations, and (3) the achievements of Ostpolitik. East-West relations were shaped by newly introduced methods of communication that opened avenues for détente and peaceful change. The experience of communicative actions led to a constellation of antagonistic cooperation in Europe. The East-West conflict continued, but conflict behavior had changed for good.

show abstract

Transforming the Soviet Sphere of Influence? U.S.-Soviet Détente and Eastern Europe, 1969-1976

Cited by 4 publications

References 2 publications

The United States, Differentiation, and Balkan Cooperation during the Cold War

The United States, Differentiation, and Balkan Cooperation during the Cold War

The United States and the NATO Non-extension Assurances of 1990: New Light on an Old Problem?

Ostpolitik: Transformation through Communication and the Quest for Peaceful Change

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About