Transcendental idealism

Philipse, Herman

doi:10.1017/ccol0521430232.007

Cited by 55 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Un número importante de intérpretes han sostenido que Husserl fue un idealista (cf. por ejemplo, Bell, 1990;Philipse, 1995;Smith, 2003;Yoshimi, 2015), por lo que la tesis planteada respecto de los universales no debe causar sorpresa. Hay muchos otros intérpretes, sin embargo, que le atribuyen una posición más matizada compatible con la postulación de realidades independientes de su modo de sernos dadas (cf.…”

Section: Precisiones Conceptuales Previasunclassified

Fenomenología de los universales

Alvarado

2019

Endoxa (Madr.)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Resumen: Husserl propone dos descripciones fenomenológicas diferentes de los universales: la primera en Investigaciones lógicas y la segunda en Experiencia y juicio. En este trabajo se presentan y discuten estas dos descripciones fenomenológicas. Resulta que la perspectiva de Experiencia y juicio parece tener que ver con un acceso hermenéutico a los universales, mediado por un lenguaje y una tradición cultural, mientras que la perspectiva de Investigaciones lógicas parece estar centrada en un fenómeno pre-lingüístico más originario. Este segundo fenómeno de los universales parece ser más fundamental. En ambas perspectivas, sin embargo, los universales son dados en nuestras experiencias ordinarias. Entonces, uno debería aceptar universales en principio –dada la evidencia fenomenológica– a menos que otras razones de orden teórico recomienden lo contrario.

show abstract

Section: Precisiones Conceptuales Previasunclassified

Fenomenología de los universales

Alvarado

2019

Endoxa (Madr.)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Cf., for example, Ingarden (1998a, 183). Cf., e.g., Ingarden (I 975), or Philipse (1995). Ingarden states explicitly that there is a connection between the development of Husserl's notion of constitution and that of his transcendental idealism, cf.…”

Section: Notes To Chapter Twomentioning

confidence: 99%

The Constitution of Consciousness

Huemer¹

2005

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I was exceptionally fortunate to work with outstanding philosophers throughout these years. I would first like to thank my supervisor Sonia Sedivy. Her open minded and modest approach to philosophy helped me to gain a clearer perspective and to better focus on the problems in question, her encouragement in difficult periods gave me the necessary motivation to continue with my project, and her suggestions and criticisms provided a stimulus without which I never could have written this text. I also want to thank my co-supervisor William Seager, for many and fruitful discussions and comments as well as interesting challenges, and James Morrison for his insightful comments on Husserl. It was a privilege to have Barry Smith as my external reader, his comments and encouragement were an essential help for bringing the manuscript to its present shape.My interest in combining the results ofHusserlian phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind was first raised by my professors during my pre-PhD studies, by Peter Simons and Johannes Brandl at the University of Salzburg, Eduard Marbach at the University of Berne, and Guido Kung at the University of Fribourg. This book shows how deeply their example has influenced my way of approaching philosophy, for which I sincerely thank them. A special thank goes to my colleagues in Erfurt, especially to Alex Burri and Christian Beyer, for their comments as well as the challenging and enlightening discussions.In this text I try to show that consciousness depends on the social group in which one grows up and lives. I had the great fortune to grow up and live with a very special group of people, whom I owe more than can be expressed here. First, I want to thank my parents for their generous support, moral and otherwise, and my sister Angela, who always set an example. The intellectual exchange with my friend and colleague John Gibson was very helpful not only Vtt viiiAcknowledgments in the development and formulation of my own position, but also for situating my views in a larger philosophical landscape and gaining interest in new topics. I also want to thank my friends Luca Pocci, Marc-Oliver Schuster, Gardar Amason, Bruno Cooren, Stefano Cracolici, and, most importantly, Karin Buttenhauser, for enriching my life before, during and after my years in Toronto.I dedicate this book to Melania Parisi, for her love, patience, and affection. It is not an exaggeration to say that she added a new dimension to my life.Parts of this work have been presented in publication before. Chapter 2 is a slightly revised version of an article that has appeared in Synthese 137 (2003), pp. 345-68, "Husserl and Haugeland on Constitution"; reprint with the kind permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers. Parts of chapter 5 have been presented at the International Wittgenstein Symposium 2001 and published under the title "The World as We See It: a Late-Wittgensteinian Argument for Direct Realism" in: Rudolf Haller and Klaus Puhl (eds),

show abstract

“…Hardy (: 164–5) says such interpretations ascribe ‘two interrelated core claims’ to Husserl's phenomenology: (1) that ‘the existence of things is dependent upon, or relative to, consciousness’, and (2) that ‘things are nothing other or more than intentional formations of transcendental consciousness’. The interpreters Hardy opposes on this score include Philipse (), Gurwitsch (), and De Boer ()—see Hardy (: 176–8, 187–9).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity: The Contemporary Significance of Early Husserl's Conception of Truth

Zuidervaart

2016

European J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This essay explores Edmund Husserl's significance for contemporary truth theory. Focusing on his Logical Investigations (1900/1901), it argues that early Husserl's conception of truth unsettles a common polarity between epistemic and nonepistemic approaches. Unlike contemporary epistemic conceptions of truth, he gives full weight to “truth makers” that have their own being: objective identity, perceptible objects, and states of affairs. Yet, unlike contemporary nonepistemic conceptions, he also insists on the intentional givenness of such truth makers and on the complexity of the experiences within which propositional truth claims arise. To develop this argument, the essay explains how early Husserl's conception of truth builds on his phenomenology of intentional experience and knowledge. By emphasizing an objective identity between what is signitively meant and intuitively given, Husserl's approach provides a way to resituate propositional truth within a broader and more dynamic conception of truth.

show abstract

Transcendental idealism

Cited by 55 publications

References 0 publications

Fenomenología de los universales

Fenomenología de los universales

The Constitution of Consciousness

Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity: The Contemporary Significance of Early Husserl's Conception of Truth

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About