Transboundary Marine Resources and Trading Neighbours

Rus, Horatiu A.

doi:10.1007/s10640-012-9554-6

Cited by 11 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…There is a large literature on shared fisheries that focuses on cross-country stock externalities, which is a different channel than we highlight (see for instance, Munro (1979), Copeland (1990), Munro (2007), Bulte and Damania (2005), Pintassilgo et al (2010) and Rus (2012)). A couple of papers on shared fisheries consider subsidies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Trade and fisheries subsidies

Bayramoglu

Copeland

Jacques

2018

Journal of International Economics

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World Trade Organization members included fishery subsidies in the Doha round of trade negotiations, which subsequently stalled. This paper develops a simple model to show why prospects for a deal on fisheries subsidies may be difficult. Typically international spillover effects create incentives among exporters to negotiate reductions in subsidies: one country's subsidy worsens other exporters' terms of trade. These incentives may not exist in fisheries for 3 reasons. First, if fisheries are severely depleted, one country's subsidy reduces its long run supply of fish, raising prices and benefiting other fish exporting countries. Second, if governments use other policies to manage fish stocks, then changes in subsidies may not affect harvests and hence may not generate international spillover effects. And third, even if governments were compelled to reduce fishery subsidies, there may be little real effect because governments would be motivated to weaken other regulations targeting the fish sector.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Trade and fisheries subsidies

Bayramoglu

Copeland

Jacques

2018

Journal of International Economics

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“…The continuous growth and transboundary nature of maritime activities calls for increased coordination between regulatory and sectoral agencies for effective planning across borders. There have been continuous calls to consider the transboundary nature of maritime activities and integration 2 in MSP (Papageorgiou & Kyvelou, 2018;Rus, 2012). In response to these calls and legislative drivers such as the EU MSP Directive 2014/89/EU, there are on-going development of institutions, concurrent co-development of science and evidence in MSP practice.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional integration in transboundary marine spatial planning: A theory-based evaluative framework for practice

Ansong¹,

McElduff²,

Ritchie³

2021

Ocean & Coastal Management

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“…The basic settings of our model (production functions of goods, utility function, renewable resource growth function, etc.) are commonly used in the analysis on trade and renewable resources such as Brander and Taylor (, , ), Emami and Johnston (), Jinji (), Rus (), and Takarada, Dong, and Ogawa (). Two goods are a resource good and manufactures, and they are produced by employing labor.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… See also Chichilnsky (), Copeland and Taylor (), Emami and Johnston (), Hotte, Long, and Tian (), and Jinji () for trade and management of local renewable resources. Recently, Rus () considers the case in which the difference in the relative carrying capacity between two countries affects the growth of a local renewable resource stock in each country. …”

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confidence: 99%

Shared renewable resources and gains from trade under technology standards

Takarada

Dong

Ogawa

2020

Review Development Economics

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Using a two-country, two-good model of international trade, we examine gains from trade and strategic interaction in resource management among countries that share renewable resources such as fishery stocks. Two goods are a resource good, which is the harvest of the shared stock, and some other good that may be thought of as manufactures. The productivity of the resource good depends on harvesting technology and the stock level. This paper focuses on technology standards (e.g., restrictions on fishing gears, vessels, areas, and time) over other methods for resource management because they are most commonly implemented in fisheries. Technology standards are modeled as a restriction on the harvesting technology; that is, under strict technology standards, firms exploit resources as if they are using inferior harvesting technology. We show that an opening up of trade may reduce the shared stock and cause steady-state utility to decrease in a resource-good importing country and increase in a resource-good exporting country. Strikingly, when the shared stock is in jeopardy (a high demand for the harvest), steady-state harvest is maximized after an opening up of trade by what we call multilateral resource management in this paper and both countries gain from trade.

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Transboundary Marine Resources and Trading Neighbours

Cited by 11 publications

References 18 publications

Trade and fisheries subsidies

Trade and fisheries subsidies

Institutional integration in transboundary marine spatial planning: A theory-based evaluative framework for practice

Shared renewable resources and gains from trade under technology standards

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