2003
DOI: 10.1177/002070200305800406
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Transatlantic Relations and Canadian Foreign Policy

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Cited by 9 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Over time, it has become more assertive and started to consider to what extent Canadian Foreign Policy would be different from heavily relying on the US. When Robert Kagan famously argued in 2002 that the transatlantic drift of the turn of the century could be seen as the Europeans being from Venus and the Americans from Mars, it hit a nerve in the Canadian context (Long, 2003; see Kagan, 2003). At the start of the negotiations that would lead to the SPA and CETA eventually signed in 2016, the EU had become a much more important potential partner to Canada than before (Haglund and Mérand, 2010).…”
Section: -2008mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Over time, it has become more assertive and started to consider to what extent Canadian Foreign Policy would be different from heavily relying on the US. When Robert Kagan famously argued in 2002 that the transatlantic drift of the turn of the century could be seen as the Europeans being from Venus and the Americans from Mars, it hit a nerve in the Canadian context (Long, 2003; see Kagan, 2003). At the start of the negotiations that would lead to the SPA and CETA eventually signed in 2016, the EU had become a much more important potential partner to Canada than before (Haglund and Mérand, 2010).…”
Section: -2008mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the European side, the first two decades, internal European integration was more developed in the area of agriculture, commerce, and trade matters rather than on security and defence matters. Thus, in addition to not having a clear sense of its strategic goals, the EU did not yet 'speak with one voice' on these more external political matters (Potter, 1999;Long, 2003;Barry, 2004;Bernard-Meunier, 2006;Croci and Verdun, 2006;Haglund and Mérand, 2010;Mérand and Vandemoortele, 2011). Second, there was also a lack of appreciation of the multilevel governance and federalist institutional set-up on both sides (Haglund, 2000;Benz, 2010;Verdun and Wood, 2010).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4Europeanism is therefore separate from (trans-)Atlanticism. For helpful discussions, see Long (2003), Mérand and Vandemoortele (2009) and DeBardeleben and Leblond (2010). …”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 Europeanism is therefore separate from (trans-)Atlanticism. For helpful discussions, seeLong (2003),Mérand and Vandemoortele (2009) and DeBardeleben and Leblond (2010). 5 During the Cold War, the principal reference point for Europe was Western Europe, while today Canadians are more likely to invoke the member states of the European Union (EU) or the EU itselfa.k.a.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Joan DeBardeleben and Patrick Leblond argue, “Canada shares with European countries many key values, including those relating to social welfare, international law, and human rights” (2010–2011: 2). Proponents of this second version of transatlantism, which is also known as Europeanism, point out that Canada has supported most EU resolutions that were submitted to the UN General Assembly (Long, 2003; Mérand and Vandemoortele, 2011). Some analysts also emphasize the fact that the European Union is currently Canada's second largest trading partner after the United States and that Canada is currently embracing a strategy of increasing trade relations with the EU in order to stimulate growth and reduce its economic dependency on the United States (Deblock and Rioux, 2010–2011: 55).…”
Section: Transatlantic Tiesmentioning
confidence: 99%