Traditional property rights, common property, and mobility in semi-arid African pastoralist systems

Abstract

Traditional pastoralist land management institutions in sub-Saharan Africa have been stressed by an increasing human population and related forces, including private enclosure of grazing land; government-sponsored privatization; and the increasing prevalence of violent conflicts and livestock theft. We model the incompleteness and flexibility of traditional grazing rights using fuzzy set theory. We compare individual and social welfare under the traditional system to individual and social welfare under a private property system and a common property system. Whether the traditional system is preferred to private property depends on whether the value of mobility, as defined by the traditional system, is more valuable than the right of exclusion inherent in private property. We find that under some conditions the imprecision which characterizes traditional rights can result in higher social returns than a common property regime characterized by complete symmetric rights across all members of the user group and complete exclusion of non-members.

A community-based evaluation of population growth and agro-pastoralist resilience in Sub-Saharan drylands

“…In the past decades, however, many pastoralist communities throughout Sub-Saharan Africa have reduced migratory practices, privatized community-owned land and switched to mixed agro-pastoralist land-uses (Jones and Thornton, 2009). Drivers of such shifts are diverse (Lesorogol, 2008), but higher population densities was a prerequisite to replace extensive practices by more labor-intensive land management techniques (Boyd and Slaymaker, 2000;Goodhue and McCarthy, 2009;Tiffen et al, 1994). Further, pastoralism and common land tenure has frequently been related to overgrazing and was long viewed as backward practice impeding development (Benjaminsen et al, 2006;Wernersson, 2018).…”

Voluntarily Relinquishing Private Property Rights: The Existence of Risk-Pooling Equilibria When Facing Environmental Uncertainty

“…Cultural norms can significantly affect the way in which individuals and groups respond to uncertainty. In a study of traditional property rights in the arid regions of Africa, Goodhue and McCarthy [11] find that even in the midst of violent conflicts and government sponsored privatization, traditional views concerning the value of mobility, as well as the right of exclusion, remain important. These norms also influence perceived social and economic benefits of private property rights, either enabling or stunting a transition to a system of shared property rights.…”

Matching spatial property rights fisheries with scales of fish dispersal

“…Management with spatial property rights can increase economic returns (e.g., yields, profits) over those attainable under quota-based management programs by reducing unnecessary competition for high-valued spatial units (Copes 1986, Cancino et al 2007, Costello and Deacon 2007. (See Christy [1982], Thwaites et al [1998], Li et al [2007], Costello and Kaffine [2008], and Goodhue and McCarthy [2009] for exceptions and a detailed discussion of challenges and failures in marine and terrestrial spatial property rights management programs.) However, when growth of an exploited natural resource disperses, overexploitation similar to that observed in open-access management can develop under spatial-rights-based management when agents Manuscript received 7 July 2009; revised 22 January 2010; accepted 8 April 2010.…”