Trading party preferences: the Australian experience of preferential voting

Federalism and New Party Insurgency in Australia

“…In part, this can be traced to the dynamics of preferential voting systems used for Australian bicameral parliamentary elections. In particular, the use of preferential voting systems-AV and PR-STV-has enabled minor parties to bargain with large parties over the exchange of preferences and, with less success, to influence government policy (Sharman et al, 2002). Since the 1950s, there have only been four party insurgencies which have had a significant effect on the outcome of federal elections, and which managed to achieve around 10% of first preference votes at both upper and lower house elections at the peak of their support: the Greens; the DLP, the Democrats, and One Nation.…”

The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting

“…The tendency of ordinary voters to follow directions from leaders, parties, or other groups increases with the complexity of voting choices. For example, the great majority of voters (almost 95% in 1998) mark their ballots to follow party recommendations in Australian Senate elections, where use of the preferential ballot, combined with the requirement of a complete ordering of candidates, can compel voters to rank literally scores of candidates (Sharman, Sayers, and Miragliotta 2002, 552) 15 . Similarly, in American cities using the “long ballot” (electing many officeholders, major and minor, at a single election), the power of party leaders derives from voters' willingness to use the party lever (where it is available) or endorsement cards, because they otherwise have no idea whom to support for most offices.…”

The alternative vote and interethnic moderation: A reply to Fraenkel and Grofman

“…Nearly all voters adhere to parties' recommended preference lists when given a chance on the ballot to endorse such lists rather than to list preferences one candidate at a time (Sharman, Sayers and Mirgliotta, 2002). Even so, some voters may not do so; and thus, when Fraenkel and Grofman (2004) purport to demonstrate that, "[e]ven when the median party is one of the moderate parties, the alternative vote does not guarantee it victory," they do not refute a claim I have made.…”

“…In Australia, too, where above-the-line voting is used for single-transferable-vote elections to the federal Senate, the ease of voting in accordance with the stated preferences of a voter's party has strengthened the ability of parties to exchange preferences, but not because those preferences somehow elude the electorate. See Sharman, Sayers and Mirgliotta, 2002. 7. In Malaysia, where a multiethnic coalition has been in power for decades, dissatisfied Malay and Chinese parties on the flanks have periodically attempted and failed to cobble together an alternative coalition.…”