2019
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12409
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Trade Policy and Market Power: Firm‐level Evidence

Abstract: This article identifies the effect of trade policy on market power through new data and a new identification strategy. We identify market power by observing how exporting firms price discriminate across markets following variations in bilateral exchange rates. Pricing‐to‐market is prevalent in all countries in our sample, even among small firms, although it is increasing in firm size. More importantly, we find that the effect of nontariff measures (NTMs) is not isomorphic to that of tariffs. Whereas tariffs re… Show more

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Cited by 21 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 67 publications
(124 reference statements)
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“…Finally, and in accordance with the evidence in Asprilla et al (2019), exporters facing higher tariffs in the destination markets adopt pricing to market strategies, by setting lower export prices when tariffs increase, thus revealing a loss of market power consistent with rentshifting effects. Indeed, tariffs induce firms to export higher quality products but at a significantly lower quality-adjusted price.…”
Section: Results In Tablesupporting
confidence: 78%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Finally, and in accordance with the evidence in Asprilla et al (2019), exporters facing higher tariffs in the destination markets adopt pricing to market strategies, by setting lower export prices when tariffs increase, thus revealing a loss of market power consistent with rentshifting effects. Indeed, tariffs induce firms to export higher quality products but at a significantly lower quality-adjusted price.…”
Section: Results In Tablesupporting
confidence: 78%
“…In addition, by working at the firm level and exploiting heterogeneous effects across firms, we can explore to what extent standards actually discriminate against small and less productive firms and, indirectly, how they affect competition in the destination markets. From this perspective, our findings appear in line with the intuition of Asprilla et al (2019). According to these authors, contrary to tariffs that reduce competition (and market power) of foreign firms through classic rent-shifting effects, NTMs alter competition by reinforcing the market power of surviving exporting firms, and are detrimental especially for smaller firms.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 88%
“…First, we show that an increase in the notification of SPS measures in an importing country limits agricultural export growth by reducing the varieties of commodities traded, the value of commodities traded, the quantity and price of commodities traded. These findings are consistent with existing works on SPS/TBTs measure [ 8 , 36 , 37 ] and existing works on import standards [ 38 ]. SPS measures play as the cost-added trade barriers, which will raise the variable trade cost and fixed trade cost, and induce the selection effect [ 2 , 24 , 39 ].…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 93%
“…It may also be misleading to consider AVEs of NTMs as a pure trade-cost effect. The change in market structure-e.g., small firms exiting the market because they cannot comply with NTMs-induced by standards confers more market power to surviving firms (Asprilla et al, 2019) who may then charge higher prices (Fiankor et al, 2020). Thus, the increase in trade unit values captures the effect of NTM compliance costs, but may also be a market concentration effect (Cadot et al, 2018b).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%