Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization

Shell, G. Richard

doi:10.2307/1372926

Cited by 115 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…More than ever, international legal scholars are using modes of analysis drawn from political science and economics to understand international organizations and law (Trachtman, 2008;Guzman, 2008;Bhandari and Sykes, 1997;Mock, 1992;Shell, 1995;Aceves, 1996;Chang, 1995;Colombatto and Macey, 1996;Setear 1996). This interdisciplinary movement is clearly evident in substantive work on compliance with international rules and on dispute settlement.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International organization: institutions and order in world politics

Thompson¹,

Snidal²

2017

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International organization: institutions and order in world politics

Thompson¹,

Snidal²

2017

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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“…The WTO had a new legal system that differs from its GATT predecessor in five major ways (Shell, 1995) [6]. First, all dispute settlement procedures under the GATT and a variety of other trade-related agreements are brought under a single dispute resolution process overseen by an institution called the WTO "Dispute Settlement Body‖ (DSB).…”

Section: B From Gatt To Wtomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These skepticisms mainly came from the international relations theory of realism. They argue that states in a realist world marked by interstate anarchy would not find sufficient common ground or trust (Shell, 1995) [6].…”

Section: Concept #1: Wto Is An Integrated Collaboration and Cooperatimentioning

confidence: 99%

Metamorphoses of the WTO: Constructing Global Governance through Trade

Fadhilla¹,

Kusumawardhana²,

Cheng³

2018

IJTEF

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Since its creation in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been one of the leading international organizations. We could expect that more countries entered the WTO because of the significance growth on world trade. However, the uniqueness of this organization does not lie on how many members it has or even the fact that trade is increasing rapidly. The creation of this new legal system in the WTO has led other new characteristics of the WTO. With strong legal system, trading among countries can be more predictable and stable which could serve as a basis for economic growth. This is one of the reasons many countries entered or remain to be the WTO member. In this paper that both of these characteristics, which are sourced from the WTO legal framework, contributed to the creation of global governance despite the growing critiques centered on the effectiveness of the WTO. Global governance suggests a world system or world society and used to describe the increasingly regulated character of transnational and international relations. Global governance implies an absence of central authority, and thus the need for collaboration and cooperation among governments and others who seek to encourage common practices and goals in addressing global issues. Even though there exist a large number of critics on the role and effectiveness of the WTO, in this paper focus on the process rather than the outcome. Similar to any problem solving, an outcome may not be preferable to one individual or group but preferable to the other. However, the system has created a forum to facilitate the discussion.

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“…Much of the critical commentary is collected in Brower (2003). and NAFTA also seems to be accepted by most of the commentators (Trachtman and Moremen 2003; but see Shell 1995). But the United States and many nongovernmental organizations favor a more limited opportunity for private actors to participate in the WTO dispute process as amici curiae.…”

Section: Prior Commentary On Standing and Remedy In International Ecomentioning

confidence: 99%

Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy

Sykes

2005

The Journal of Legal Studies

101

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This paper develops a theory of the rules regarding standing and remedy in international trade and investment agreements. Regarding investment agreements, the paper argues that a credible government-to-firm commitment (or signal) that the capital importer will not engage in expropriation or related practices is required and that a private right of action for money damages is the best way to make such a commitment. In trade agreements, by contrast, importing nations have commitments that are best viewed as government to government rather than government to firm. The parties to trade agreements can enhance their mutual political welfare by declining to enforce commitments that benefit politically inefficacious exporters and can most cheaply do so by reserving to themselves the standing to initiate dispute proceedings—a right to act as a political filter. The paper also suggests why governments may prefer to utilize trade sanctions rather than money damages as the penalty for breach of a trade agreement.

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Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization

Cited by 115 publications

References 0 publications

International organization: institutions and order in world politics

International organization: institutions and order in world politics

Metamorphoses of the WTO: Constructing Global Governance through Trade

Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy

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