Trade-in and save: A two-period closed-loop supply chain game with price and technology dependent returns

Abstract

Consumers evaluate the convenience of changing their products according to the price paid as well as the technology (quality) level. When the consumers wish to capitalize the products residual value, they should return them as early as possible. Accordingly, we develop a model of Closed-loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where consumers seek to gain as much as possible from their returns and the return rate is a function of both price and quality. We model a two-period Stackelberg game to capture the dynamic aspects of a CLSC, where the manufacturer is the channel leader. We investigate who, namely, manufacturer or retailer, should collect the products in the market. Thus, we identify the best CLSC structure to adopt when the return rate is both price-and quality-dependent. Our results demonstrate that it is always worthwhile for companies to collect products and adopt an active return approach for returns. We investigate the eect of retail competition in both forward and backward channels and show the impact of eliminating the double marginalization on market outcomes.

Solving closed-loop supply chain problems using game theoretic particle swarm optimisation

“…Amin and Zhang, 2013;Min et al, 2006;Jayaraman et al, 2003). In other studies, various forms of outsourcing in relation to RL operations, including inspections and sorting, refurbishing and disposal, have been considered (Genc and De Giovanni, 2017;De Giovanni and Zaccour, 2014;Kumar and Putnam, 2008). However, we observe increasing attention being given to using existing forward chain channel relationships for RL as well; under the oversight of the OEM with or without third party involvement (De Giovanni and Zaccour, 2014; Easwaran and Uster, 2010;Mutha and Pokharel, 2009;Fuente et al, 2008;Srivastava, 2008;Savaskan et al, 2004).…”

Decentralized supply chain network design: monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly competitions under uncertainty

“…Also this is usually related to operational characteristics and leads to Nash game; most of the dynamic games in SC literature are unconstrained models that solved by differential systems (Xiao and Yang 2008;Zhang 2006;Dias 2010, 2013;Sinha and Sarmah 2010;Friesz et al 2011, Jain et al 2014Chen et al 2015;Nagurney et al 2015;Mousavi et al 2016;Santibanez-Gonzalez and Diabat 2016;Hjaila et al 2016a;Jahangoshai Rezaee et al 2017;Lipan et al 2017). (3) Competition with foresight: in this competition, the rivals show reactions to the entry of new comer in sequential manner and usually this is related to strategic characteristics; this competition leads to bilevel or multi-level models and stackelberg games (Drezner and Drezner 1998;Plastria and Vanhaverbeke 2008;Kucukaydın et al 2011, Zhang and Liu 2013Yue and You 2014;Zhu 2015;Drezner et al 2015;Taleizadeh and Charmchi 2015;Yang et al 2015, Esmaeilzadeh andTaleizadeh 2016;Hjaila et al 2016b;Aydin et al 2016;Ezimadu and Nwozo 2017;Genc andGiovanni 2017. Eiselt andLaporte 1997;Krass and Pesch 2012 have done a review of this kind of competition.…”

“…Also in SC competition literature, there are three kinds of competitions: horizontal competition: competition between firms of one tier of a SC (Nagurney et al 2002;Dong et al 2004;Cruz 2008;Zhang and Zhou 2012;Qiang et al 2013;Huseh 2015;Qiang 2015;Nagurney 2016, Nagurney et al 2016); vertical competition: competition between the firms of different tiers of a SC (Bernstein and Federgruen 2005;Anderson and Bao 2000;Chen et al 2013, Wu 2013Zhao and Wang 2015;Zhang et al 2015;Bai et al 2016;Bo and Li 2016;Esmaeilzadeh and Taleizadeh 2016;Huang et al 2016;Wang et al 2017;Genc and Giovanni 2017;Chaeb and Rasti-Barzoki 2016); and SC versus SC: competition between SCs (Boyaci and Gallego 2004;Xiao and Yang 2008;Zhang 2006;Li et al 2013;Chung and Kwon 2016). Ezimadu and Nwozo (2017) used Sethi model to models the dynamic effect of the manufacturer and retailer's advertising efforts on sale and by the help of control technique and stochastic differential game theory the players' advertising strategies and the long-run value of the awareness share are obtained.…”

Managing consumer behavior toward on-time return of the waste electrical and electronic equipment: A game theoretic approach

“…The consumers' return utility is defined as a linear function of the mentioned parameters. Recently, Genc and De Giovanni [41] incorporated the consumers' return behavior into a two-period model of closed-loop supply chain. In their study, the return rate is linked to the value and quality of the return, however, it has been assumed that all consumers behave homogeneously.…”