“…The results in Table also show that trade execution costs are lower for young bonds, which is broadly consistent with the well‐documented “on‐the‐run” phenomenon, where newly issued Treasury and corporate securities enjoy more liquid markets (Krishnamurthy () and Ronen and Zhou ()). During the January 2006 to June 2007 benchmark period, trading costs averaged 0.23% for young bonds versus 0.44% for older bonds.…”
We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.
“…The results in Table also show that trade execution costs are lower for young bonds, which is broadly consistent with the well‐documented “on‐the‐run” phenomenon, where newly issued Treasury and corporate securities enjoy more liquid markets (Krishnamurthy () and Ronen and Zhou ()). During the January 2006 to June 2007 benchmark period, trading costs averaged 0.23% for young bonds versus 0.44% for older bonds.…”
We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.
“…However, from a game theory perspective, it also makes sense for informed investors to spread their trades among many bonds in order to conceal their information. To gain further insights, we identify the bond that attracts the most institutional trade volume around earnings announcements as the “top bond” for each firm/ announcement, as in Ronen and Zhou () (see also Mahanti et al. , for the impact of institutional trading on bond liquidity) .…”
Section: Predicting Earnings Surprises and Post‐announcement Bond Retmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Earlier studies rely on the vector autoregression (VAR) modes to determine the lead‐lag relationship between stocks and bonds in incorporating firm specific information, and found conflicting results . The special institutional features of the corporate bond market have led Ronen and Zhou () to question the ability of the VAR approach in capturing the dynamics of information revelation and argue in favor of event studies for cross‐market comparisons. By examining the information content of bond trading prior to earnings announcements, our study complements Ronen and Zhou () and suggests that VAR and pair‐wise comparisons between the time‐series of bond and stock prices might not be effective in fully revealing the relative informational efficiency of the stock and corporate bond markets.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, our study contributes to the literature on the relevance of earnings information for the credit markets. Empirical studies have documented significant bond market reactions to earnings announcements (Datta and Dhillion, ; Hotchkiss and Ronen, ; Ronen and Zhou, ). By focusing on the information content of trading activities before earnings announcements, our study suggests that the earnings impact on bond prices might have been even larger than previously documented, because the trading by informed traders has incorporated some information into the prices prior to the public announcements.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Warga (), and Ronen and Zhou () define institutional trades as those that are above $500,000 in par value. Other studies have used $100,000 to define an institutional trade (see, for example, Edwards et al., ; Goldstein et al., ).…”
This paper examines the information content of corporate bond trading prior to earnings announcements using data from both NAIC and TRACE. We find that the direction of preannouncement bond trading is closely related to earnings surprises. This link is most evident prior to negative news and in high-yield bonds. Further, abnormal bond trading during the preannouncement period can help predict both earnings surprises and post-announcement bond returns. Such predictive ability of bond trading largely originates from institutional-sized trades and is concentrated in the issuer's most actively traded bond. Finally, even after accounting for transactions costs, informed bond trading can generate significant net profits, especially prior to the release of bad news.
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