2014
DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifu037
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Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy

Abstract: The current EU Asylum policy is widely seen as ineffective and unfair. We propose an EUwide market for tradable quotas on both refugees and asylum-seekers coupled with a matching mechanism linking countries' and migrants' preferences. We show that the proposed system can go a long way towards addressing the shortcomings of the current system. We illustrate this claim using the recent problems regarding relocation faced by the European Relocation from Malta (EUREMA) program.

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Cited by 59 publications
(30 citation statements)
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References 14 publications
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“…Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport [3][4][5] use a matching system embedded in the tradeable immigration quotas system they propose for, among other things, the distribution of refugees over EU countries. Furthermore, Jones and Teytelboym advertise the implementation of matching systems both on a local [6] and on a global [7] scale.…”
Section: Asylum As College Admissions Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport [3][4][5] use a matching system embedded in the tradeable immigration quotas system they propose for, among other things, the distribution of refugees over EU countries. Furthermore, Jones and Teytelboym advertise the implementation of matching systems both on a local [6] and on a global [7] scale.…”
Section: Asylum As College Admissions Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Call the number of refugees assigned in a matching its cardinality. The cardinality of a matching depends on the set of acceptable refugee-country pairs, i.e., the set E ⊆ R × C. 4 Call maximum cardinality (MC) the desideratum that matchings should not waste places. More precisely, for a given CA-instance, a matching M satisfies (MC) if and only if |M| ≥ |M | for all matchings M .…”
Section: Maximum Cardinality Vs Stabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Allowing refugees to express their preference can reduce costs and misunderstandings in relocation processes, as has been documented in respect to the European relocation from Malta, undertaken by the EU in a pilot program in 2009-2011 [11]. During the program, many European member states reported serious communication problems with the refugees and asylum seekers, who were often unaware of their final destination.…”
Section: Stage 3: Matching Refugees To Countriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Previous work of the author, co-authored with Hillel Rapoport, contains a larger number of background references for the material presented here and has been used intensively in all major parts of this article [7], [9], and [11]. Support from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain), grant MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, grant MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444), is gratefully acknowledged.…”
Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%