Tracking the Filibuster, 1917 to 1996

Abstract

Scholars and observers of the U.S. Senate have noted an appreciable rise in the use of the filibuster over the course of the 20th century. Although numerous explanations have been offered, alternative accounts have never been pitted against each other in a multivariate fashion. In this article, we survey and test these multiple accounts, using data on filibusters launched between 1917 and 1996. Our findings suggest that the incentive to filibuster is predictably shaped by both partisan preferences and institutional opportunity, findings that hold even before the marked rise in partisanship evident at late century.

Peculiar Institutions: Slavery, Sectionalism, and Minority Obstruction in the Antebellum Senate

“…The predictions of Dion (1997) and Binder, Lawrence, and Smith (2002) with regard to the majority party are complementary, although on the surface they appear to conflict with each other. Dion focuses mainly on size, whereas Binder, Lawrence, and Smith focus on strength, which is a function of size and cohesiveness.…”

“…First, the model includes a dummy variable measuring membership in the minority party, which should have a positive coefficient. Second, I included the measures of majority and minority party strength used by Binder, Lawrence, and Smith (2002), which are a function of the parties' seat shares and their cohesiveness (see also Binder 1997, 220-22). I employed this more-nuanced measure of party strength rather than party size because it speaks more directly to the arguments about threats to the status quo.…”

“…Measures of workload that have been used in the literature, such as the number of public laws passed and the number of days in session, could be consequences as well as causes of obstruction. Binder, Lawrence, and Smith (2002) include in their aggregate-level analysis a variable measuring the number of civilian federal employees in a given year as a proxy for external policy demands placed on the Senate. Unfortunately, this variable does not exist for all of the Congresses covered by my analysis.…”

“…Extant research generally examines obstruction through the prism of partisanship (Binder 1997;Binder and Smith 1997;Binder, Lawrence, and Smith 2002;Dion 1997). Party-based theories of obstruction have proven to be successful in explaining obstruction in the modern Senate, but other factors may be equally or more relevant to explaining this behavior prior to the Civil War.…”

Effort, Intensity and Position Taking

“…Bawn and Koger (2005) argue that the key difference between modern filibusters and those of the Progressive Era is due to the system of double tracking developed in the 1960s and 1970s, which lowered both the cost of filibustering and the cost of tolerating a filibuster. Binder et al (2002) also emphasize the role of double tracking in lowering the costs of obstruction to both sides. for hours, although senators also killed time by requesting unnecessary votes.…”