2013
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2013.0061
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Tracking the “Arab Spring”: Why the Modest Harvest?

Abstract: The Arab Spring startled all Arab autocrats but toppled few of them. We find there were no structural preconditions for popular uprisings, but two variables conditioned whether domestic opposition would succeed. First, oil wealth gave rulers the resources to preempt or repress dissent. Second, a precedent of hereditary succession signaled the loyalty of the coercive apparatus to the ruler. Consequently, mass revolts deposed incumbents in only the three non-oil rich, non-hereditary regimes of Tunisia, Egypt, an… Show more

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Cited by 55 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…Following the neo‐liberal project, what David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession,” the state in Egypt was complicit in pushing the poor out of their tenure rights in favor of the needs of the corporations (Bayat, :95) For Bayet, the discontents were “triggered by developmental deficits, social problems, political repression, or corruption” (Bayat, :22), to which may be added a democracy deficit. Moving beyond the “proximate variables … such as the diffusion of social‐networking tools and the posture of the army,” Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (:30) suggest that “there were no structural preconditions for the emergence of uprisings.”…”
Section: Human Development Index In 2010 and 2016 In The Arab Spring mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Following the neo‐liberal project, what David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession,” the state in Egypt was complicit in pushing the poor out of their tenure rights in favor of the needs of the corporations (Bayat, :95) For Bayet, the discontents were “triggered by developmental deficits, social problems, political repression, or corruption” (Bayat, :22), to which may be added a democracy deficit. Moving beyond the “proximate variables … such as the diffusion of social‐networking tools and the posture of the army,” Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (:30) suggest that “there were no structural preconditions for the emergence of uprisings.”…”
Section: Human Development Index In 2010 and 2016 In The Arab Spring mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…15 Again building on Brownlee et al (2013), I distinguish between countries where regime change took place and those were it did not. In three of the nine, the full set of institutional rules was replaced, leading to a fundamentally different type of political system, but, as Table 1 indicates, the outcomes are quite different.…”
Section: Arab Uprisingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The question has shifted from whether the so-called 'Arab spring' overturns accepted wisdoms about the Middle East to 'why did the 'Arab Spring' yield so modest a harvest?' 1 Posing the question in this way returns the study of comparative politics in the Arab world to the status quo ante the uprisings: a debate alternating between searching for faint signs of 'democratic transition' on the one hand, and the attempt to understand an apparently resilient authoritarianism on the other. 2 The intervention of democratization theorists into this long-running debate stresses political cultural explanations for the failure of democratic transition, such as the Sultanistic character of pre-Uprising regimes, the role of religion in public life 3 or the lack of trust, rooted in authoritarian inheritances that obstructed negotiated transitions.…”
Section: Take Down Policymentioning
confidence: 99%