Tracking a Person Over Time Is Tracking What?

Brook, Andrew

doi:10.1111/tops.12107

Cited by 6 publications

(27 citation statements)

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“…After presenting a cluster of arguments establishing that the face‐recognition program presents serious limitations (Section 3), I argue that such a program needs to be integrated into a causal‐historical theory of identification (Sections and ). Several of the other contributions to this issue provide treatments of person identification that are broadly consistent with using a causal‐historical theory to explain person identification (Brook, ; Gelman, Noles, & Stilwell, ; Newman, Bartels, & Smith, ; Sagi & Rips, ).…”

Section: Explaining Identification Behaviors Aimed At Tracking Peoplementioning

confidence: 85%

“…This difference can account for the fact that participants in laboratory experiments perform face‐recognition tasks better when they have to recognize familiar rather than unfamiliar faces. It also suggests a way to account for some errors in person identification (see also Brook, : Section ; Langdon, Connaughton, & Coltheart, ), such as the difficulty that people experience when they have to recognize unfamiliar faces from images like photographic lineups (Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Cling, ; Young & Bruce, : p. 962).…”

Section: The Face‐recognition Research Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The individualistic models of person recognition described in Section have not sought to explain how such cooperative methods can expand and bias the mechanisms of person identification (Section ). They have not sought to account for the fact that person identification is a prerequisite of a variety of practices involving social cooperation such as authenticating the alleged identity of someone (e.g., unmasking an impersonator), attributing moral and legal responsibility, enforcing commitments and rights (Brook, ), and gathering surveillance data about people from social networks (Nissenbaum, ).…”

Section: The Incompleteness Of the Face‐recognition Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the authors do not provide a specification of the concepts of a person's identity and personal information. Psychological research on eyewitness identification (e.g., Lampinen et al., ) and interpersonal sensitivity (Bombari et al., ) tends to overlook this question as well, although the question of personal identity is fundamental to ethical and legal problems associated with person identification (see DeGrazia and Section in Brook, ). In contrast to these theories, I argue in Section 4 that the analysis of a tracker's conceptions of a target person's persistence and causal organization is relevant to the science of person identification.…”

Section: The Incompleteness Of the Face‐recognition Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, a problem that is closely tied to research on tracking is the persistence question (Olson, /2010), also known as the reidentification question , which queries what makes a person at time t 0 the same person as a person at time t − 1 and/or time t + 1 . The philosophical theories that address the persistence question have investigated a wide range of criteria for personal persistence, including causal contiguity (Nozick, ; Rips et al., ; Sagi & Rips, ), organismic continuity (DeGrazia, ; Wilson & Barker, /2013), and psychological connectedness (e.g., Brook, ; Parfit, ; Shoemaker, ).…”

Section: The Incompleteness Of the Face‐recognition Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Explaining Person Identification: An Inquiry Into the Tracking of Human Agents

Bullot

2014

Topics in Cognitive Science

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To introduce the issue of the tracking and identification of human agents, I examine the ability of an agent ("a tracker") to track a human person ("a target") and distinguish this target from other individuals: The ability to perform person identification. First, I discuss influential mechanistic models of the perceptual recognition of human faces and people (the face-recognition program). Such models propose detailed hypotheses about the parts and activities of the mental mechanisms that control the perceptual recognition of persons. However, models based on perceptual recognition are incomplete theories of person identification because they do not explain several identification behaviors that are fundamental to human social interactions (e.g., identifying unobservable persons and imposters). Furthermore, recognition-based models tend to appeal to the controversial concept of the "identity" of a person without explaining what determines personal identity and persistence. To overcome these limitations, I propose to integrate the face-recognition program into a broader causalhistorical theory of identification. The causal-historical theory of identification complements models focused on perceptual recognition because it can account for the types of non-perceptual identification overlooked by the face-recognition program. Moreover, it can decompose the identification behaviors into tracking processes that succeed or fail to be sensitive to causal characteristics of a target. I illustrate these advantages with a discussion of the difference between the tracking of a person understood as either a causally continuous biological organism (organism-based tracking) or a psychologically continuous mind (psychological tracking). Finally, I argue that the causal-historical theory provides a theoretical framework for investigating the tracking of relations between a target and its contextual and historical attributes, such as a target's possessions.

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Section: Explaining Identification Behaviors Aimed At Tracking Peoplementioning

confidence: 85%

Section: The Face‐recognition Research Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Incompleteness Of the Face‐recognition Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Incompleteness Of the Face‐recognition Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Incompleteness Of the Face‐recognition Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Explaining Person Identification: An Inquiry Into the Tracking of Human Agents

Bullot

2014

Topics in Cognitive Science

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Biometrics and the metaphysics of personal identity

Kind

2021

IET Biometrics

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The vast advances in biometrics over the past several decades have brought with them a host of pressing concerns. Philosophical scrutiny has already been devoted to many of the relevant ethical and political issues, especially ones arising from matters of privacy, bias, and security in data collection. But philosophers have devoted surprisingly little attention to the relevant metaphysical issues, in particular, ones concerning matters of personal identity. This paper aims to take some initial steps to correct this oversight. After discussing the philosophical problem of personal identity, the ways in which the notion of biometric identity connects with, or fails to connect with, the philosophical notion of personal identity is explored. Though there may be some good reasons to use biometric identity to track personal identity, it is contended that biometric identity is not the same thing as personal identity and thus that biometrics researchers should stop talking as if it were.

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Keeping Track: The Tracking and Identification of Human Agents (Editorial Preface)

Rich¹,

Bullot

2014

Topics in Cognitive Science

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Tracking a Person Over Time Is Tracking What?

Cited by 6 publications

References 9 publications

Explaining Person Identification: An Inquiry Into the Tracking of Human Agents

Explaining Person Identification: An Inquiry Into the Tracking of Human Agents

Biometrics and the metaphysics of personal identity

Keeping Track: The Tracking and Identification of Human Agents (Editorial Preface)

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