Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners’ Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union

Gehring, Kai; Schneider, Stephan A.

doi:10.1257/pol.20160038

Cited by 34 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…We follow the application of the test in the context of panel data proposed by Gehring and Schneider (2016). We compare pooled OLS estimations with a limited set of controls (our treatment variable, and either municipal or time fixed effects) and the full set of controls as shown in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8).…”

Section: Baselinementioning

confidence: 99%

Opening hours of polling stations and voter turnout: Evidence from a natural experiment

Potrafke

Roesel

2018

Rev Int Organ

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Voter turnout has declined in many industrialized countries, raising the question of whether electoral institutions increase voter turnout. We exploit an electoral reform in the Austrian state of Burgenland as a natural experiment to identify the causal effect of opening hours of polling stations on voter turnout. The results show that a 10 percent increase in opening hours increased voter turnout by some 0.5 to 0.9 percentage points. The effect is substantial because voter turnout was already around 80 percent before the reform in question. The results also show that the vote share of the conservative party decreased in the course of the reform, while the vote shares of the social democratic party and of the populist rightwing party (both parties attract blue-collar workers) increased. Enhancing participation in elections by extending the opening hours of polling stations remains a question to what extent politicians and voters believe that the benefits of higher voter turnout overcompensate for additional costs of longer opening hours.

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Section: Baselinementioning

confidence: 99%

Opening hours of polling stations and voter turnout: Evidence from a natural experiment

Potrafke

Roesel

2018

Rev Int Organ

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“…However, there are authors who have confirmed our hypothesis in the case of other international institutions. Gehring and Schneider () test this hypothesis with the European Union. They examine whether having a Commissioner for Agriculture is correlated with an increase in the spending on agriculture for the respective countries of origin.…”

Section: Imf Operationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does being an IMF executive board member (Re)pay? An examination of IMF loans and repayments

Malan¹

2018

World Economy

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This paper analyses the political economy of IMF loans and repayments using data from 99 countries over the period 1984–2014. We bring two contributions to the literature, analysing: (i) the impact of the presence of a country on the IMF Executive Board and (ii) repayment behaviour (and not only loan requests). We show evidence that loans from, and repayments to, the IMF are influenced by the presence of countries on the IMF Executive Board. In particular, the results indicate that a position on the Board increases the loan amount by approximately 0.5 points and the repayment amount by approximately 0.2 points.

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“…1 See, e.g., Gehring and Schneider (2018) and Aksoy (2010) who show that, respectively, the EU Commissioner for Agriculture and the EU President are able to influence the budget allocation in favor of their home countries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, the paper adds to the related literature studying the politics behind different financing instruments of the EU (for general reviews, see, Alesina et al 2005, Baldwin andWyplosz 2012). In particular, studies find that political factors, such as voting and proposal powers of the Member States in the EU, but also other international organizations, systematically affect the allocation of the EU Budget (see, among others, Aksoy 2010, 2012, Bachtler and Mendez 2007, Bodenstein and Kemmerling 2012, Gehring and Schneider 2018, Mikulaschek 2018, Schneider 2013). 6 Our contribution to this literature is to document the existence of home-bias at the regional level in addition to the previously found biases at the national level.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Multilateral Lending to European Regions

Asatryan

Havlik

2019

SSRN Journal

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We study the political economy of allocation decisions within a major state investment bank. Our focus is the European Investment Bank (EIB)-"The Bank of the EU"-which is the largest multilateral lending (and borrowing) institution in the world. We collect (and make available) information on the regions of origin of about 500 national representatives at the EIB's Board of Directors-the decisive body for loan approvals-since its foundation in 1959 and show that a representative's appointment increases the probability of her sub-national region receiving a loan by about 17 percentage points. This "home-bias" effect is driven by large loans financing infrastructure projects. We provide several pieces of evidence, which are consistent with the hypothesis that home-bias lending may lead to resource misallocation, however we cannot conclusively demonstrate this case of economic inefficiency.

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Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners’ Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union

Cited by 34 publications

References 50 publications

Opening hours of polling stations and voter turnout: Evidence from a natural experiment

Opening hours of polling stations and voter turnout: Evidence from a natural experiment

Does being an IMF executive board member (Re)pay? An examination of IMF loans and repayments

The Political Economy of Multilateral Lending to European Regions

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