Towards Non-Being

Priest, Graham

doi:10.1093/0199262543.001.0001

Cited by 329 publications

(67 citation statements)

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“…See also Fine (2009) for a nuanced view in the vicinity. For more classic Meinongian-inspired views see Crane (2012), Finn (2017, Priest (2005Priest ( , 2008, and Routley (1980Routley ( , 1982. 27 Suppose, however, a compromise is reached.…”

Section: Neutralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics

Doulas

2020

Philos Stud

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Some metaphysicians believe that existence debates are easily resolved by trivial inferences from Moorean premises. This paper considers how the introduction of negative Moorean facts-negative existentials that command Moorean certainty-complicates this picture. In particular, it shows how such facts, when combined with certain plausible metaontological principles, generate a puzzle that commits the proponents of this method to a contradiction.

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Section: Neutralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics

Doulas

2020

Philos Stud

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“…The presupposition of this objection is highly questionable, for it remains unclear if quantificational constructions are ontologically committing (Priest 2005;Crane 2013;Azzouni 2017;Collins 2017). Indeed, trivially, one can speak of most things or at least one thing or anything that doesn't exist.…”

Section: Quantifying Over Fictamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contemporary discussions, the loci classici of this view areParsons (1974Parsons ( , 1980 andZalta (1983), and more latterlyPriest (2005). Whether Meinong himself was Meinongian is moot (seeCrane, 2013, for sound discussion).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Diversity of Fiction and Copredication: An Accommodation Problem

Collins

2019

Erkenn

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The paper presents an accommodation problem for extant semantic accounts of fiction. Some accounts of fiction are designed to accommodate one or another form of fictive statement exclusively, what I shall call in-fiction (roughly, statements made within fiction) and out-fiction (roughly, statements relating fictional things and events to extra-fictional things and events). Thus, typically, the accounts fail to do justice to their respective excluded form. A natural response, entertained by Kripke (Reference and existence. The John Locke lectures. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) and in a different fashion by latter-day Meinongians, is to let the two different kinds of fiction have their respective accounts. It is very easy, however, to mix in and out predicates, which amounts to a species of copredication, where a single nominal receives simultaneous distinct interpretations relative to distinct predicates without creating ambiguity (Bond is a killer but remains as popular as ever). Copredication is a perfectly general phenomenon that arises for any nominal (The meal was delicious, but lasted all day/Bill read then burnt every book/Brazil is at last happy after the civil unrest). The simple problem now is that copredication appears to render all extant accounts of fiction either (1) essentially partial, in dealing with one kind of simple form of fiction but not another, or (2) merely wrong in imagining that fiction comes in categorically distinct forms, for the coherence of copredication is enough to show that this is not so. The aim of the paper is to show to resolve this accommodation problem by the radical expedient of suggesting that the fiction/non-fiction distinction is not really a semantic one, but more one between different ways in which sentences are made true or false.

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“…But every fiber of my being cries out in protest" (ibid., p. 28). 20 For the purposes of this paper, I ignore Meinongians, who believe that there are things which lack being (noneism) and that there are a plurality of ways of being (pluralism), and contemporary noneists such as Routley (1980) and Priest (2005) who, roughly, reject pluralism. They perhaps would say that derivative reality doesn't exist, but subsists.…”

Section: Follow Vonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fundamental truthmakers and non-fundamental truths

Schipper

2019

Synthese

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Recently, philosophers have tried to develop a version of truthmaker theory which ties the truthmaking relation (t-rel) closely to the notion of fundamentality. In fact, some of these truthmaker-fundamentalists (tf-ists), as I call them, assume that the notion of fundamentality is intelligible in part by citing, as central examples of fundamentals, truthmakers, which they understand necessarily as constituents of fundamental reality. The aim of this paper is first to bring some order and clarity to this discussion, sketching how far tf is compatible with orthodox truthmaking, and then critically to evaluate the limits of tf. It will be argued that truthmaker theory cannot directly help with articulating the nature of fundamental reality and that t-rel does not necessarily relate truths with anything more fundamental, unless what is fundamental is what the truthbearers in question are about. I shall argue that tf faces a rather thorny dilemma and some general problems. I shall present two exhaustive types of fundamentalism on which a version of tf can be based: deflationary and inflationary. It will be argued that each version of tf runs into significant troubles accounting for all truth, specifically ordinary truths and metaphysical truths about the relations between ordinary facts and fundamental facts. I shall not attempt to solve these problems, but rather, at the end, diagnose the issues with tf as lying in the difficulties with reconciling the manifest image with the scientific and metaphysical images of reality.

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Towards Non-Being

Cited by 329 publications

References 0 publications

A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics

A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics

The Diversity of Fiction and Copredication: An Accommodation Problem

Fundamental truthmakers and non-fundamental truths

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