Towards Model Checking of Voting Protocols in Uppaal

STV+AGR: Towards Verification of Strategic Ability Using Assume-Guarantee Reasoning

“…A good example of a specific domain is formal verification of voting procedures and elections, with a number of classical requirements, such as election integrity, ballot secrecy, receipt-freeness, and voter-verifiability [42,44]. Some recent case studies [23,25,28] have shown that practical verification of such scenarios is still outside of reach. Some tools do not support intuitive specification and validation of models; some others have limited property specification languages.…”

“…Unfortunately, model checking of agents with imperfect information is ∆ P 2 -to PSPACE-complete for memoryless strategies [9,22,43] and EXPTIME-complete to undecidable for agents with perfect recall [18,20]; also, the problem does not admit simple incremental solutions [10,16,17]. This has been confirmed in experiments [11,12,21,26,40] and case studies [23,25,28].…”

STV+AGR: Towards Practical Verification of Strategic Ability Using Assume-Guarantee Reasoning

“…Another intuitive set of strategic requirements is provided by properties of secure voting systems [27,29]. As shown by case studies [16,14,18] practical verification of such properties is still infeasible due to state-space and strategy-space explosion. STV+AGR addresses the specification and verification of such properties, as well as a userfriendly creation of models to be verified.…”