Towards formal verification of IoT protocols: A Review

Hofer-Schmitz, Katharina; Stojanović, Branka

doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107233

Cited by 72 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Due to the rapid development and evolving nature of technologies and their associated communication protocols, a large number of security protocols have been developed and deployed in order to provide secure communication [ 8 ]. The analysis of security protocols is becoming increasingly difficult for manual and analytical techniques like ’Gong–Needham–Yahalom’ (also called the GNY) logic and ’Burrows-Abadi-Needham’ (also called the BAN) logic [ 18 ]. Therefore, the formal analysis of the security protocol relies more on an automated falsification or verification of such protocols using state-of-the-art tools such as the ProVerif or AVISPA [ 34 ] tools, which have been shown to be effective at finding attacks on protocols (AVISPA) or establishing the correctness of protocols (ProVerif).…”

Section: Definition Of the Security Properties Evaluated By Scythementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, the formal analysis of the security protocol relies more on an automated falsification or verification of such protocols using state-of-the-art tools such as the ProVerif or AVISPA [ 34 ] tools, which have been shown to be effective at finding attacks on protocols (AVISPA) or establishing the correctness of protocols (ProVerif). One of the improved and automated security claim verification tools used in the literature is Scyther [ 18 , 19 , 35 , 36 ], which is based on a pattern refinement algorithm, which can provide concise representations of (infinite) sets of attack traces. In this experiment, Scyther is used to perform the security analysis of the GOOSE communication protocol.…”

Section: Definition Of the Security Properties Evaluated By Scythementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The GOOSE protocol description was written in the Security Protocol Description Language (SPDL) [ 18 ] semantics to interpret the communication flow of the protocol in a Scyther understandable format. As illustrated in Figure 6 , the GOOSE communication flow starts from OP5600 by sending three user-defined parameters below, named the Protocol Data Unit (PDU), to the publisher.…”

Section: Experimental Validation Of Goose’s Vulnerabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A rigorous verification is made of the GOOSE protocol using both automatic and manual security analysis using Scyther. There are various automated security claim verification tools whose detailed reviews can be found in [ 18 , 19 ]. Scyther [ 18 , 20 ] has a number of advantages including its effectiveness for different attack cases, support for multiple protocols, its operational semantics of security protocols, etc.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are various automated security claim verification tools whose detailed reviews can be found in [ 18 , 19 ]. Scyther [ 18 , 20 ] has a number of advantages including its effectiveness for different attack cases, support for multiple protocols, its operational semantics of security protocols, etc. Although other security verification techniques can also be used, in this article, the Scyther tool is utilized where a rigorous security verification of the GOOSE protocol is found using both automatic and manual security analysis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid

Reda

Ray

Peidaee

et al. 2021

Sensors

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

IEC 61850 is one of the most prominent communication standards adopted by the smart grid community due to its high scalability, multi-vendor interoperability, and support for several input/output devices. Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE), which is a widely used communication protocol defined in IEC 61850, provides reliable and fast transmission of events for the electrical substation system. This paper investigates the security vulnerabilities of this protocol and analyzes the potential impact on the smart grid by rigorously analyzing the security of the GOOSE protocol using an automated process and identifying vulnerabilities in the context of smart grid communication. The vulnerabilities are tested using a real-time simulation and industry standard hardware-in-the-loop emulation. An in-depth experimental analysis is performed to demonstrate and verify the security weakness of the GOOSE publish-subscribe protocol towards the substation protection within the smart grid setup. It is observed that an adversary who might have familiarity with the substation network architecture can create falsified attack scenarios that can affect the physical operation of the power system. Extensive experiments using the real-time testbed validate the theoretical analysis, and the obtained experimental results prove that the GOOSE-based IEC 61850 compliant substation system is vulnerable to attacks from malicious intruders.

show abstract

Section: Definition Of the Security Properties Evaluated By Scythementioning

confidence: 99%