Towards faster settlement in HTLC-based Cross-Chain Atomic Swaps

Mazumdar, Subhra

doi:10.1109/tps-isa56441.2022.00043

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…HTLCs do not guarantee atomicity under longstanding crashes due to the synchronous nature of the protocol. The majority of the solutions alter the synchronous communication assumptions by inserting intermediary networks [80], [87], or focus on the usage of premiums [40], [95], [137]. A premium is a value staked as collateral before the execution of the actual protocol.…”

Section: Secret-based and Time-based Locksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Action Withhold / User starvation ( 13 ). An attacker may intentionally abort a protocol execution or withhold an action to harm other parties or increase the possibility of profitability [40], [74], [78], [95], [106], [179].…”

Section: Submission Of Repeated Inclusion Proofs (mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some protocols have been proposed to solve the aforementioned issues. The majority alter the synchronous communication assumptions [80], [87], while the ones that retain that property focus on the usage of premiums [40], [95], [137]. A premium is a value staked as collateral before the execution of the actual protocol.…”

Section: Off-chain Communication Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Simultaneously, it needs to be small enough so that parties engage in the swap -i.e., accept the risk of losing this value. There are multiple game-theoretical analyses of HTLCs or simple variations such as [38], [40], [99], [138]. In particular, [138] proves that the protocol has a higher chance of being successful (instead of being aborted) under these collateralized models or employing dynamic exchange rate adjustments.…”

Section: Off-chain Communication Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, in case of a revert, the victim still loses funds. These kinds of vulnerabilities are seen in Griefing or Sore Loser Attacks [40], [95], [179]. It can happen if the economic conditions (e.g., exchange rates) are suddenly not favourable to the attacker; or to mount a DoS attack on the counterparty [40].…”

Section: Submission Of Repeated Inclusion Proofs (mentioning

confidence: 99%

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SoK: Security and Privacy of Blockchain Interoperability [Extended Version]

Augusto,

Belchior,

Correia

et al. 2024

Preprint

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Recent years have witnessed significant advancements in cross-chain technology. However, the field faces two pressing challenges when it comes to security and privacy. Hacks on cross-chain bridges have led to monetary losses of around 3 billion USD, highlighting flaws in security models governing interoperability mechanisms (IMs) and the ineffectiveness of incident response frameworks. Additionally, the exploration of privacy within cross-chain scenarios remains relatively unexplored. Hackers benefit from extensive privacy, whereas users and bridge operators experience restricted privacy, thereby broadening the potential attack surface for adversaries. In this paper, we present the most comprehensive study to date on the security and privacy of blockchain interoperability. Our study employs a rigorous systematic literature review, yielding a corpus of 178 relevant documents, including 58 academic papers and 120 gray literature documents, out of a pool of 531. We systematically categorize 56 interoperability solutions based on a newly created taxonomy focusing on security and privacy considerations. Our dataset, comprising academic research, disclosures from bug bounty programs, and audit reports, exposes 45 cross-chain vulnerabilities, 25 theoretical attacks, and 88 mitigation strategies. Leveraging this data, we analyze 14 notable bridge hacks accounting for over USD 2.9 billion in losses, mapping them to the identified vulnerabilities. Our findings reveal that a substantial portion (65.8\%) of stolen funds originates from projects secured by permissioned intermediary networks with unsecured cryptographic key operations. Regarding privacy, we demonstrate that achieving unlinkability in cross-chain transactions is contingent on the underlying ledgers providing some form of confidentiality. In conclusion, our study offers critical insights into the challenges and vulnerabilities within the realm of cross-chain interoperability. We pinpoint promising directions for future research that can guide both industry practitioners and academics toward substantial advancements in this field. Our work underscores the urgency of enhancing security and privacy measures in cross-chain technology to mitigate the substantial financial risks associated with bridge hacks and to foster user trust in the blockchain ecosystem.

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Section: Secret-based and Time-based Locksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Submission Of Repeated Inclusion Proofs (mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Off-chain Communication Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Off-chain Communication Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Submission Of Repeated Inclusion Proofs (mentioning

confidence: 99%

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SoK: Security and Privacy of Blockchain Interoperability [Extended Version]

Augusto,

Belchior,

Correia

et al. 2024

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Fast Payments Across Heterogeneous Blockchains for Internet of Things

Lin,

Wang,

et al. 2024

IEEE Access

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Internet of Things data exchange services facilitate the connection and flexible exchange of data among distributed IoT data sources. Traditional IoT data exchange services typically involve direct data uploads to the cloud, allowing service providers to generate significant profits through IoT data analysis. However, this approach exposes data owners to privacy risks while not benefiting them from the service providers' gains. Furthermore, the use of different blockchain architectures by various IoT networks presents challenges for achieving cross-chain interoperability. Although blockchain technology has ensured the security and integrity of IoT data transactions, its efficiency remains a concern. To address these issues, we propose a real-time cross-chain transaction scheme for IoT data exchange in an IoT environment. Our scheme aims to address the real-time security challenges associated with cross-chain data interactions. First, we established a secure and fair settlement scheme by employing a smart contract model based on collateral and challenge mechanisms. In addition, cryptographic tools are utilized to enhance the expressive capabilities of weakly secure service providers, thereby reducing reliance on third-party security assumptions. Finally, through experimentation, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our smart contract model in reducing the time required for on-chain transactions.INDEX TERMS Atomic Cross-Chain Swap, Internet of Things, Fast Payments, Blockchain.

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