Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations

Change and Continuity in the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Ukraine Crisis as a Critical Juncture

“…Political relations between EU member states and Russia were severely complicated. 2 Countries such as France and Germany were forced strike a cautious balance between their economic interests in a stable bilateral relationship with Russia and the EU's stance vis-à-vis Russia, especially concerning the imposition of sanctions. 3,4 For other European countries, such as Poland or Lithuania, the Ukraine crisis was a stark reminder of their vulnerability to potential Russian aggression, despite their membership of both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).…”

Consensus against all odds: explaining the persistence of EU sanctions on Russia

“…Similarly, Forsberg (2016) argues that Germany grew willing to bear the economic cost of sanctions on Russia while concurrently pursuing co-operation and dialogue. For Nitoiu (2016), leadership in the Ukraine crisis represents continuity in Berlin's post-Cold War Ostpolitik, while for Siddi (2018) it culminates a long-standing quest. Some scholars highlight the personal engagement of certain leaders to account for the consensus on EU sanctions, pointing to Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland before becoming President of the European Council (Pospieszna 2018), or Chancellor Merkel (Forsberg 2016; Orenstein and Kelemen 2017; Sjursen and Rosén 2017).…”

“…This included the Baltic republics and Poland, followed by the Nordics, Romania and the UK (Dobbs 2017). At the opposite end of the spectrum, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Portugal and Spain, but also Hungary and Austria (Webber 2019), were inclined to engage with Russia due to burgeoning economic ties, cultural and religious links and/or the absence of recent conflicts (Natorski and Pomorska 2017;Nitoiu 2016). In-between both, key members France and Germany adopted a moderate position.…”

Has Russia heard about the European Union’s Arcticness? The EU’s Arctic steps as seen from Russia

“…In that regard, the EU's relationship with Russia has always been considered the main axis in Northern European regional cooperation (Aalto, 2013, p. 104). Whereas other political initiatives have floundered, the ND has been seen as "low-political and technical" (Haukkala, 2010, p. 9) and the European North as a region where divergence in worldviews and commonalities between the EU and Russia, and also internal disagreement among Member States on how to approach Russia, have had less impactin contrast to the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood, as observed during the 2014 Ukraine crisis (Cadier, 2018;Ferguson, 2018;Nitoiu, 2016).…”

“…The "European Union exception" in Russian Arctic policy Over the last three decades, EU-Russia (power) relations have fluctuated wildly, defying simple analysis (Forsberg, 2013;Forsberg & Haukkala, 2016;Foxall, 2017, p. 174). The broader evolution and nature of this relation can be roughly divided into three phases (Haukkala, 2015, p. 26): first, a formative phase in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, characterised by optimism and joint efforts; the second phase, more troublesome but still marked by optimism, between 1994 and 2000, influenced by the Russian economic crash of 1998, NATO's engagement in the wars on the Balkan Peninsula and the EU's negative response to Russian actions in the Chechen wars (Nitoiu, 2016). In the third phase, the EU was increasingly seen as a hostile power.…”