Towards a Pure Ontology: Children’s bodies and morality

Abstract

'Now, can we say that some thirsty people sometimes refuse to drink?' 'Yes, lots of them,' he said. 'Often.' 'What can be said about these people, then? Can't we say there is something in their soul telling them to drink, and also something stopping them? Something different from, and stronger than, the thing telling them they should drink?' 'Yes, I think we can say that', he said. 'The thing which stops them in these cases-doesn't it arise, when it does arise, as a result of rational calculation, whereas the things which drive or draw them towards drink are the products of feelings and disorders?' 'Apparently.' 'It will be a reasonable inference, then', I said, 'that they are two completely different things. The part of the soul with which we think rationally we call the rational element. The part with which we feel sexual desire, hunger, thirst, and the turmoil of the other desires can be called the irrational and desiring element, the companion of indulgence and pleasure.' 'Yes', he said, 'that would be a perfectly natural conclusion for us to come to.'