Towards a Critical Realist Comparative Methodology: Context-Sensitive Theoretical Comparison

Abstract

This article provides a critical realist take on comparative methodology. Heeding the call for greater attention to the ontological presuppositions inherent in all methods, it fi rst outlines comparative methods as they have traditionally been conceived and practised. Discerning two important aspects of these approaches -their notion of causality and their reliance on inductive inferences -the discussion moves on to consider their applicability within a critical realist social science. Arguing that the ontological presuppositions of traditional approaches to comparative methodology are not compatible with the ontology of critical realism, it seeks to specify some initial steps in the direction of designing a new approach securing this compatibility. Important to this new approach is theoretical, or abductive, comparison and the need to be context-sensitive.

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