Towards a cognitive neuroscience of self-awareness

Lou, Hans C.; Changeux, Jean‐Pierre; Rosenstand, A.

doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.04.004

Cited by 94 publications

(82 citation statements)

References 89 publications

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“…In this regard, there is evidence that during wakefulness the right prefrontal cortex participates in self‐recognition (Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual‐Leone, ), metacognitive evaluation and self‐relevance (Schmitz, Kawahara‐Baccus, & Johnson, ), and in the perception of time (Koch, Oliveri, Carlesimo, & Caltagirone, ) and planning (Goel & Grafman, ). Furthermore, there is evidence that the prefrontal cortex is related to the organization of goal‐directed behavior (Fuster, ), metacognition (Middlebrooks & Sommer, ), self‐monitoring (Luu, Collins, & Tucker, ), and self‐awareness (Lou, Changeux, & Rosenstand, ). In fact, several studies have shown that alpha rhythms are modified over sensorimotor areas during the preparation, execution, and imagination of movement or during somatosensory stimulation (Arroyo et al, ; Neuper, Wörtz, & Pfurtscheller, ; Pfurtscheller, Neuper, Andrew, & Edlinger, ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alpha electroencephalographic activity during rapid eye movement sleep in the spider monkey (Ateles geoffroyi): An index of arousal during sleep?

et al. 2018

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There is evidence that some animal species have developed physiological and behavioral mechanisms to monitor potential predatory threats during rapid eye movement sleep (REMS). Nevertheless, it has not been reported in arboreal primates. The present study analyzed the sleeping postures, as well as the electromyographic and electroencephalographic (EEG) activities during three conditions: REMS, non-REMS (N-REMS), and wakefulness in spider monkeys. The study included six monkeys, whose EEGs were recorded at the O1-O2, C3, C4, F3, and F4 derivations to analyze relative power (RP) and interhemispheric, intrahemispheric, frontoposterior, and central-posterior coherence of frequency bands, which has been considered an index of arousal states. The bands analyzed were theta (4.0-7.0 Hz), alpha1 (8.0-10.5 Hz), alpha2 (11.0-13.5 Hz), and beta (14.0-30.0 Hz). Spider monkeys adopt a vertical posture during sleep, and in REMS a lack of muscular atonia was observed. The RP of the alpha bands at O1-O2 was higher during REMS than that during wakefulness, N-REMS1, and N-REMS2. At the C3 derivation, the RP of alpha1 was higher during REMS than that during N-REMS2. The RP of both alpha bands at the F4 derivation was higher during REMS than that during wakefulness, whereas REMS was characterized by a higher coherence between the F3 and O1-O2 derivations of the alpha2 band. These prevalences and the higher coherence of alpha bands during REMS could represent a correlate of behavioral traits and activated cortical areas related to a possible arousal state in spider monkeys while sleeping.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alpha electroencephalographic activity during rapid eye movement sleep in the spider monkey (Ateles geoffroyi): An index of arousal during sleep?

et al. 2018

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“…Whether they can engage in selfreferential conscious thinking (141), and thus have self-awareness, is less certain (20,142,143). Self-awareness is viewed by many as a uniquely human experience (112,135,136,(144)(145)(146)(147). Klein (148) draws an important distinction between episodic memory (memory of what happened, where it happened, and when it happened) and autonoetic consciousness (the awareness that the facts about what, where, and when happened to you).…”

Section: A Modified Higher-order Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The cognitive functions (working memory, attention, metacognition, and so forth) and neural circuits (especially prefrontal circuits) that underlie HORs are also required for conscious experiences involving the self, including emotional states involving the self (145,(156)(157)(158)(159)(160)(161)(162) Fig. 3 for HOT).…”

Section: A Modified Higher-order Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

LeDoux

Brown

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

436

417

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Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.uch progress has been made in conceptualizing consciousness in recent years. This work has focused on the question of how we come to be aware of our sensory world, and has suggested that perceptual consciousness emerges via cognitive processing in cortical circuits that assemble conscious experiences in real-time. Emotional states of consciousness, on the other hand, have traditionally been viewed as involving innately programmed experiences that arise from subcortical circuits.Our thesis is that the brain mechanisms that give rise to conscious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences. Both, we propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lowerorder information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC). Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits (the distinction between cortical and subcortical circuits is defined in SI Appendix, Box 1). Our theory goes beyond traditional higher-order theory (HOT), arguing that self-centered higherorder states are essential for emotional experiences.Emotion, Consciousness, and the Brain Detailed understanding of the emotional brain, and theorizing about it, is largely based on studies that fall under the heading of "fear." We will therefore focus on this body of work in discussing emotional consciousness. In light of this approach, we define "fear" as the conscious feeling one has when in danger. Although our conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.The Amygdala Fear Circuit View. Emotions like fear are often said to have been inherited from animal ancestors (1-6). These "basic emotions" are typically proposed to be wired into the brain's limbic system (7). Although the limbic sy...

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“…Therefore, it is not clear that so-called subjectivity theories all endorse the claim that self-awareness properly speaking (an awareness of oneself , or a sense of self) is a necessary condition for consciousness. In any case, even outside of the debate about SCP, many publications in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy have endorsed the general idea that consciousness necessarily involves some kind of sense of self or self-awareness (e.g., Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2005; Strawson, 2011; Lou et al, 2016). Let us call this specific claim the “self-awareness principle” (SAP) 5 :

(SAP) Necessarily, whenever one is in a conscious state, one is minimally self-aware .

…”

Section: The Significance Of Died For Philosophy Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He comes close to explicitly endorsing SAP, although he does not formulate a necessity claim: “my current experience’s pre-reflective self-consciousness strikes me as egological—that is, as a form of peripheral self -awareness… There is an elusive sense of self-presence or self-manifestation inherent in even a simple conscious experience of the blue sky.” (Kriegel, 2009; p. 177). See also Damasio (1999, p. 19): “If ‘self-consciousness’ is taken to mean ‘consciousness with a sense of self’, then all human consciousness is necessarily covered by the term—there is just no other kind of consciousness as far as I can see”; and Lou et al (2016): “self-awareness is an integral function of all conscious experiences”.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution

Millière

2017

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

144

155

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There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid receptor (KOR). While these substances act on different neurotransmitter receptors, they all produce strong subjective effects that can be compared to the symptoms of acute psychosis, including ego dissolution. It has been suggested that neuroimaging of DIED can indirectly shed light on the neural correlates of the self. While this line of inquiry is promising, its results must be interpreted with caution. First, neural correlates of ego dissolution might reveal the necessary neurophysiological conditions for the maintenance of the sense of self, but it is more doubtful that this method can reveal its minimally sufficient conditions. Second, it is necessary to define the relevant notion of self at play in the phenomenon of DIED. This article suggests that DIED consists in the disruption of subpersonal processes underlying the “minimal” or “embodied” self, i.e., the basic experience of being a self rooted in multimodal integration of self-related stimuli. This hypothesis is consistent with Bayesian models of phenomenal selfhood, according to which the subjective structure of conscious experience ultimately results from the optimization of predictions in perception and action. Finally, it is argued that DIED is also of particular interest for philosophy of mind. On the one hand, it challenges theories according to which consciousness always involves self-awareness. On the other hand, it suggests that ordinary conscious experience might involve a minimal kind of self-awareness rooted in multisensory processing, which is what appears to fade away during DIED.

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Towards a cognitive neuroscience of self-awareness

Cited by 94 publications

References 89 publications

Alpha electroencephalographic activity during rapid eye movement sleep in the spider monkey (Ateles geoffroyi): An index of arousal during sleep?

Alpha electroencephalographic activity during rapid eye movement sleep in the spider monkey (Ateles geoffroyi): An index of arousal during sleep?

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution

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