Toward supply side incentive: The impact of government schemes on a vehicle manufacturer's adoption of electric vehicles

Chen, Zhongwei; Fan, Zhi‐Ping; Zhao, Xuan

doi:10.1111/itor.13133

Cited by 13 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Zhang et al [27] studied the impacts of two government subsidies to consumers for two types of green product on the economic and environmental performance of a two-echelon supply chain. Chen et al [28] analyzed the impact of the consumer subsidy scheme on a vehicle manufacturer's profit, the consumer and social welfare.…”

Section: Government Financial Incentive In Supply Chain Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Gu,

Xue,

Zhao

et al. 2023

Systems

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Government subsidies generally play an important role in the sustainable operations management of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). This paper investigates the optimal government subsidy decision and its influence on the sustainable development of the CLSC, consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, from the economic, environmental, and social perspectives. Based on game analysis technology, different Stackelberg game models among the government and the CLSC members are formulated to analyze the optimal decisions under different power structures. By conducting theoretic comparative and sensitivity analyses and a case study, the effects of the government subsidy and the power structure are explored from the total profit, environmental benefit, and social welfare. Results show that the subsidy is good for sustainable development of the CLSC, which improves the total profit of the CLSC members, environmental benefit, and social welfare and the improvement effect is more prominent when the CLSC members have unequal bargaining power. Moreover, according to the growth proportion of profit, the retailer and collector benefit more from the subsidy among the CLSC members when they have different bargaining power, otherwise, the CLSC members benefit equally from the subsidy, and the subsidy is more beneficial to the environment compared with the total supply chain profit and social welfare.

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Section: Government Financial Incentive In Supply Chain Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Gu,

Xue,

Zhao

et al. 2023

Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Second, this study is related to EV investment, similar to an equipment replacement problem (He et al, 2021). Previous investigations have focused on operating and maintenance costs, government policy, critical technological and consumer preferences on replacement decisions (Alp et al, 2022; Chen et al, 2022; He et al, 2017; Huang et al, 2021; Peng et al, 2021). The preceding literature primarily used mathematical and theoretical models to analyze product investment in a deterministic environment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When to invest in electric vehicles under dual credit policy: A real options approach

et al. 2023

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This research aims to investigate traditional vehicle manufacturers' green technology investment theory under dual credit policy from the perspective of real options, overcoming earlier investigations of this issue that considered it only from a stability or single uncertainty perspective. An analytical real options model was first provided for traditional automaker investment. Then we solved the analytical solution for the electric vehicle investment threshold based on the uncertainty of credit price and fuel vehicle market scenarios. The optimal electric vehicle investment timing is demonstrated using numerical simulation. Results show that (1) when the fuel vehicle market demand falls to a certain level, automakers will choose to make electric vehicle investments regardless of how the credit price changes in the market; (2) the effect of volatility on the investment threshold depends on the covariance or correlation coefficient; (3) the numerical simulation results revealed that the credit price drift rate, risk‐free rate, correlation parameters, and electric vehicle production cost all have a positive impact on the electric vehicle investment region, whereas the drift rate of fuel vehicle and electric vehicle production cost have a negative impact. These results can be used to make theoretical conclusions about electric vehicle investments.

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Stakeholder perspectives on government subsidy programs: Trade‐in subsidy, consumption subsidy, or mixed subsidy?

Tang,

Ma,

Dai

et al. 2024

Naval Research Logistics

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Many governments worldwide offer various types of consumer‐specific subsidy programs, such as a trade‐in subsidy (TS) program that targets existing consumers only, a consumption subsidy (CS) program that covers both new and existing consumers with undifferentiated subsidy levels, or a mixed subsidy (MS) program that targets the two consumer segments with differentiated subsidy levels. However, which program is more beneficial to social welfare and other stakeholders is largely unknown. In this paper, we establish a game‐theoretic model to explore the impacts of these subsidy programs on different stakeholders (i.e., the firm, consumers, the environment, and social welfare). Interestingly, we uncover that the TS and MS programs have equal effectiveness in stimulating demand (collecting old products) from existing consumers, whereas the CS and MS programs have relative advantages in expanding the total demand from both new and existing consumers. We further find that (i) when product durability is low, the flexible MS scheme can lead to a quadruple‐win for all stakeholders, (ii) when product durability is moderate, the MS scheme is better for social welfare and the environment, whereas the CS scheme benefits the firm and consumers more, and (iii) when product durability is high, the MS scheme can achieve a triple‐win for the firm, consumers, and social welfare, whereas the CS scheme is better for the environment. Moreover, we identify the differential impacts of each program on different stakeholders when considering that the earmarked subsidy is limited and a secondary market exists. Our findings not only shed light on why the TS, CS, and MS programs are all likely to be adopted in practice but also provide helpful guidelines for governments aiming to offer a more effective subsidy program.

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Toward supply side incentive: The impact of government schemes on a vehicle manufacturer's adoption of electric vehicles

Cited by 13 publications

References 29 publications

Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

When to invest in electric vehicles under dual credit policy: A real options approach

Stakeholder perspectives on government subsidy programs: Trade‐in subsidy, consumption subsidy, or mixed subsidy?

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