Toward Religious Polarization? Time Effects on Religious Commitment in U.S., UK, and Canadian Regions

The remaining core: a fresh look at religiosity trends in Great Britain

“…To distinguish between the actively religious and the unaffiliated, we combine two indicators of institutional religiosity found in the 1983–2012 BSA: religious affiliation and frequency of religious service attendance . Our previous research has shown that institutional religiosity does not always follow a linear pattern, in that the nominally affiliated middle ground may show different trends and have different effects on other variables than the two extreme groups of the unaffiliated and the actively religious (Wilkins‐Laflamme ). As a result, we split level of institutional religiosity into three categories and measure trends and effects separately for each: Unaffiliated: includes all respondents who declare that they have no religion …”

“…These instances point to a new phase in the religious landscape characterized most notably by religious–secular divide where smaller and more defensive religious groups stand opposite a non‐religious majority. Some researchers even refer to this new configuration as one of polarization where a core group of more and more fervent and active believers contrasts an ever more secular portion of Western populations (Achterberg et al ; Kaufmann ; Martin ; Putnam and Campbell ; Roy ; Wilkins‐Laflamme ). Nevertheless, empirical testing of this polarization theory remains scarce, and the burgeoning idea has been met with some criticism in the British context (Bruce ; Glendinning and Bruce ).…”

Secularization and the Wider Gap in Values and Personal Religiosity Between the Religious and Nonreligious

“…Moreover, in areas where the religiously committed have seen some decline and the unaffiliated have been growing for some time, there appears to be a type of bottoming‐out effect regarding the religiously committed group: this now smaller group becomes proportionally stable due to it being able to reproduce itself demographically (Kaufmann, Goujon, and Skirbekk ). Decline in these cases then comes more from the nominally affiliated middle ground (Wilkins‐Laflamme ).…”

“…To distinguish between the actively religious and the unaffiliated, I combined two indicators of institutional religiosity found in the 2008 ISSP: religious affiliation and frequency of religious service attendance. Previous research has shown that institutional religiosity does not always follow a linear pattern, in that the nominally affiliated middle ground may show different trends and has different effects on other variables than the two extreme groups of the unaffiliated and the actively religious (Wilkins‐Laflamme ). Accordingly, I split the level of institutional religiosity into three categories and measure effects separately for each of them: Unaffiliated: all respondents who declare that they have no religion …”

Religious polarization: contesting religion in secularized Western European countries

“…food quality or demands for workers' rights) are nonetheless imbued with Catholic values. This cultural aspect of Catholicism makes is more difficult for the typical Catholic in doubt to disaffiliate from the church than it would be for the typical Protestant, which also accounts for the higher Catholic levels of nominal affiliation indicated above (Wilkins-Laflamme 2014). This Catholic hold on national cultures has empowered the defense of national identities and values against competing totalitarian powers, as for instance in Poland during the Cold War (Martin 1978, 24), and in doing so, it has also played a major role in withstanding secularizing forces (for the time being, see Bruce 2002, 31).…”