Toward an Operational Navigation Message Authentication Service: Proposal and Justification of Additional OSNMA Protocol Features

Hernández, Ignacio Fernández; Ashur, Tomer; Rijmen, Vincent; Sarto, Carlo; Cancela, Simon; Calle, D.

doi:10.1109/euronav.2019.8714151

Cited by 16 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Later in 2018, I. Fernandez-Hernandez et al, (2018a, 2018b introduced the developing program and the policy perspective of the OSNMA. Hernandez et al (2019) focuses on the authentication of the public keys and renewal and revocation of all keys.…”

Section: Open Service Navigation Message Authentication For Galileomentioning

confidence: 99%

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

Yuan

Tang

2023

Satell Navig

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Civilian services of Global Navigation Satellite System are threatened by spoofing attacks since it is hard to determine the authenticity of a navigation signal with a detailed structure open to the public. Signal authentication effectively protects the security of the signal by attaching unforgeable information to one or several elements of the signal. Receivers can verify the authenticity of the signal by extracting and validating this information. Developing good signal authentication schemes requires understanding possible spoofing modes, signal element specialty, and performance evaluation methods. This paper is an overview of navigation signal authentication, where the theories and reported approaches are described in detail. A design/performance matrix that demonstrates the advantages and defects of the signal element and its authentication design is summarized. Recommendations are proposed to improve the robustness, security, efficiency, and implementation hardness for future designs of navigation signal authentication.

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Section: Open Service Navigation Message Authentication For Galileomentioning

confidence: 99%

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

Yuan

Tang

2023

Satell Navig

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“…Then, with a delay with respect to x, the key is broadcast as side information, so that the receiver is able to reconstruct x. A similar approach can be adopted to describe Galileo OS-NMA [11], [12], possibly combined with CAS [10] or ACAS features [9]. The model in [22] can be cast into this frame by restricting x to be a binary watermarking sequence, and the attacker to have complete ignorance on it, thus, removing his observation z.…”

Section: Authentication Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We assume that x is a zero mean Gaussian random vector, so p x ∼ N (0, K x ) and the optimality of this choice will be proven in Section IV-A. Under this assumption, as proved in [30], there exists an optimal attack p v|z minimizing the divergence in (12). Theorem 1.…”

Section: Attack Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some SCE solutions are the P(Y) code for GPS and the commercial authentication service (CAS) for Galileo. CAS is currently under development, but is expected to be established by 2024: in particular, a proposal known as assisted CAS (ACAS), recently presented in [9], [10], provides a SCE method where the encryption key is derived from the unpredictable signature in the Galileo open service navigation message authentication (OS-NMA) [11], [12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the Optimal Spoofing Attack and Countermeasure in Satellite Navigation Systems

Crosara¹,

Ardizzon²,

Tomasin³

et al. 2023

Preprint

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The threat of signal spoofing attacks against global navigation satellite system (GNSS) has grown in recent years and has motivated the study of anti-spoofing techniques. However, defense methods have been designed only against specific attacks. This paper introduces a general model of the spoofing attack framework in GNSS, from which optimal attack and defense strategies are derived. We consider a scenario with a legitimate receiver (Bob) testing if the received signals come from multiple legitimate space vehicles (Alice) or from an attack device (Eve). We first derive the optimal attack strategy against a Gaussian transmission from Alice, by minimizing an outer bound on the achievable error probability region of the spoofing detection test. Then, framing the spoofing and its detection as an adversarial game, we show that the Gaussian transmission and the corresponding optimal attack constitute a Nash equilibrium. Lastly, we consider the case of practical modulation schemes for Alice and derive the generalized likelihood ratio test. Numerical results validate the analytical derivations and show that the bound on the achievable error region is representative of the actual performance.

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“…To ease the reading of the paper, this section briefly recalls the main concepts behind the OSNMA scheme; refer to [21][22][23][24] for more complete and detailed descriptions.…”

Section: The Osnma In Briefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Computational Load Analysis of a Galileo OSNMA-Ready Receiver for ARM-Based Embedded Platforms

Gamba

Nicola

Motella

2021

Sensors

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Many GNSS applications have been experiencing some constantly growing needs in terms of security and reliability. To address some of them, both GPS and Galileo are proposing evolutions of their legacy civil signals, embedding features of authentication. This paper focuses on the Galileo Open Signal Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) and describes its implementation within a real-time software receiver for ARM-based embedded platforms. The innovative contributions of the paper include the software profiling analysis for the OSNMA add on, along with the comparison among performances obtained with different platforms. In addition, specific evaluations on the computational load of the whole receiver complete the analysis. The receiver used for the implementation belongs to the NGene receivers family—real-time fully-software GPS and Galileo receivers, tailored for different platforms and sharing the same core processing. In detail, the paper deals with the introduction of the OSNMA support inside the eNGene, the version of the receiver executable by ARM-based embedded platforms.

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Toward an Operational Navigation Message Authentication Service: Proposal and Justification of Additional OSNMA Protocol Features

Cited by 16 publications

References 5 publications

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

On the Optimal Spoofing Attack and Countermeasure in Satellite Navigation Systems

Computational Load Analysis of a Galileo OSNMA-Ready Receiver for ARM-Based Embedded Platforms

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