Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk

Abstract

Although coup risk plays an important role in theories of war, revolution, and democratization, scholars have not developed a rigorous conceptualization and valid measure of the concept. We develop a structural understanding of coup risk as distinct from proximate causes of coups as well as coup-proofing strategies that regimes implement to avert coups. Theoretical insights into factors that predispose regimes toward coup vulnerability provide the groundwork for an improved measure based on strength of civil society, legitimacy, and past coups. Cross-national statistical analyses are used to significantly improve on previous coupincidence models and highlight deficiencies of the common approach to measuring coup risk. The structural conceptualization of coup risk enhances understanding of broader civil-military dynamics, in particular the well-known distinction between motives and opportunities for launching coups. This distinction is shown to be insensitive to an important observational equivalence: that coups may be rare in both high-and low-risk cases.

Can Robust Party Systems Rein Military Coups? Evidence from the New Democracies of the South

“…Johnson et al (1984) replicated Jackman`s study with wider dataset, ending up to the same conclusion. Civil society impact is also consistent with what Belkin and Schofer (2003) found. They`ve found that civil society is a significant predictor of military coups d`etat.…”

Can Robust Party Systems Rein Military Coups? Evidence from the New Democracies of the South

“…Johnson et al (1984) replicated Jackman`s study with wider dataset, ending up to the same conclusion. Civil society impact is also consistent with what Belkin and Schofer (2003) found. They`ve found that civil society is a significant predictor of military coups d`etat.…”

A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and Fourth-Wave Democracies

“…The fi ndings here support the theoretical claim that a strong civil society generates polities that can avoid the domestic political turmoil associated with interventionist militaries and coups (see Hibbs, 1977;Putnam, 1967). In fact, recent research has incorporated the density of NGOs as a measure that can lessen the likelihood of military coups -strong and dense civil societies serve as a "coup-proofi ng" mechanism that prevents military adventurism (see Belkin and Schofer, 2003). To sum up, both strong pre-and post-transitional civil society associationalism have statistically signifi cant effects in increasing levels of political stability (although post-transitional strength in both organizational and membership density is highly signifi cant at p < .01, while pre-transitional strength is only marginally signifi cant at p < .10).…”

Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty

“…Thus, we expect leaders to be both unwilling and unable to engage in enhanced coup-proofing in the face of protests, instead being forced to rely on the measures they already have in place to prevent coups when protests arise. This argument is consistent with the empirical reality of coup-proofing measures (Belkin and Schofer 2003, 2005), which change quite slowly overtime. Further, if leaders indeed think strategically in this manner, such maneuvers should only weaken the expected relationship between protests and coups.…”

Can Robust Party Systems Rein Military Coups? Evidence from the New Democracies of the South

“…Johnson et al (1984) replicated Jackman`s study with wider dataset, ending up to the same conclusion. Civil society impact is also consistent with what Belkin and Schofer (2003) found. They`ve found that civil society is a significant predictor of military coups d`etat.…”

A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and Fourth-Wave Democracies

“…The fi ndings here support the theoretical claim that a strong civil society generates polities that can avoid the domestic political turmoil associated with interventionist militaries and coups (see Hibbs, 1977;Putnam, 1967). In fact, recent research has incorporated the density of NGOs as a measure that can lessen the likelihood of military coups -strong and dense civil societies serve as a "coup-proofi ng" mechanism that prevents military adventurism (see Belkin and Schofer, 2003). To sum up, both strong pre-and post-transitional civil society associationalism have statistically signifi cant effects in increasing levels of political stability (although post-transitional strength in both organizational and membership density is highly signifi cant at p < .01, while pre-transitional strength is only marginally signifi cant at p < .10).…”

Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty

“…Thus, we expect leaders to be both unwilling and unable to engage in enhanced coup-proofing in the face of protests, instead being forced to rely on the measures they already have in place to prevent coups when protests arise. This argument is consistent with the empirical reality of coup-proofing measures (Belkin and Schofer 2003, 2005), which change quite slowly overtime. Further, if leaders indeed think strategically in this manner, such maneuvers should only weaken the expected relationship between protests and coups.…”

Can Robust Party Systems Rein Military Coups? Evidence from the New Democracies of the South

“…Johnson et al (1984) replicated Jackman`s study with wider dataset, ending up to the same conclusion. Civil society impact is also consistent with what Belkin and Schofer (2003) found. They`ve found that civil society is a significant predictor of military coups d`etat.…”

A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and Fourth-Wave Democracies

“…The fi ndings here support the theoretical claim that a strong civil society generates polities that can avoid the domestic political turmoil associated with interventionist militaries and coups (see Hibbs, 1977;Putnam, 1967). In fact, recent research has incorporated the density of NGOs as a measure that can lessen the likelihood of military coups -strong and dense civil societies serve as a "coup-proofi ng" mechanism that prevents military adventurism (see Belkin and Schofer, 2003). To sum up, both strong pre-and post-transitional civil society associationalism have statistically signifi cant effects in increasing levels of political stability (although post-transitional strength in both organizational and membership density is highly signifi cant at p < .01, while pre-transitional strength is only marginally signifi cant at p < .10).…”

Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty

“…Thus, we expect leaders to be both unwilling and unable to engage in enhanced coup-proofing in the face of protests, instead being forced to rely on the measures they already have in place to prevent coups when protests arise. This argument is consistent with the empirical reality of coup-proofing measures (Belkin and Schofer 2003, 2005), which change quite slowly overtime. Further, if leaders indeed think strategically in this manner, such maneuvers should only weaken the expected relationship between protests and coups.…”