Toward a policy-relevant psychology of avoiding nuclear war: Lessons for psychologists from the Cuban missile crisis.

Blight, James G.

doi:10.1037/0003-066x.42.1.12

Cited by 28 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…The model presented here is relevant to the psychology of nuclear policymakers as well as to that of the general public. Blight (1987) has argued persuasively that psychology's contribution to reducing the risk of nuclear war has been limited by a failure to appreciate the psychological reality of nuclear policymakers. Specifically, Blight has contended that psychologists tend to conceptualize the essential source of the nuclear threat as the dysfunctional relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.…”

Section: P S Y C H O L O G Y and A R M S Control A C T I V I S Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dynamics of inaction: Psychological factors inhibiting arms control activism.

Gilbert¹

1988

American Psychologist

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Studies consistently indicate that the American public strongly opposes many aspects of current nuclear arms policy. However, despite this strong sentiment, only a small number of individuals are actively involved in opposing nuclear policies. Explanations of this lack of behavioral response that emphasize public apathy fail to account for prior instances of widespread public involvement in the area o farms control (e.g., the successful protest over atmospheric testing and the massive nuclear freeze rallies in 1982). Thus, the analysis of arms control inactivity must extend beyond general critiques of public apathy toward an understanding of factors that promote or inhibit behavioral opposition. The current article outlines a set of psychological factors that may serve to interrupt the connection between strong conviction against nuclear arms policies and subsequent political action. These proposed factors are used to evaluate the psychological utility of existing and potential strategies for promoting arms control activism. Subsequently, the implications of this conceptual framework for psychology' s understanding and promotion of arms control activism are discussed.

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Section: P S Y C H O L O G Y and A R M S Control A C T I V I S Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dynamics of inaction: Psychological factors inhibiting arms control activism.

Gilbert¹

1988

American Psychologist

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“…Furthermore, as Blight (1987) has pointed out, policymakers generally perceive psychological theory to be irrelevant to the realities of making the tough decisions. Perhaps they share the view of psychology as a treatment‐oriented profession and therefore, perceive psychologists as naïve when it comes to the reality of policymaking.…”

Section: Limitations In Any Psychological Analysis Of International Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

Terrorism: A Peace Psychological Analysis

Wagner

2006

Journal of Social Issues

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Peace psychologists emphasize the importance of recognizing both direct and structural bases of peace and conflict. In the peace psychological analysis of terrorism presented here, I attempt to further our understanding of the bases of terrorism in the context of how inequities in political, economic, and social structures may feed into or exacerbate terrorism. I analyze the effectiveness of responses to terrorism in terms of the tripartite peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding model of nonviolent response to violence.Prior to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, peace psychologists interested in international themes of peace, conflict, and violence focused primarily on conflicts outside the borders of the United States. The principal arenas that caught their attention were Palestine and Israel, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia, Northern Ireland, Angola, South Africa, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan.The 9/11 attack, however, pushed international terrorism to the fore (Wagner, 2002). U.S. psychologists began to focus on the causes and effects of terrorism, from both practical and scholarly perspectives. Psychology's initial concern was, understandably, with treating the psychological aftermath of 9/11: the mental health of injured survivors, families of victims, people living close to the sites of the attacks, as well as the fire and police personnel and emergency relief workers who responded to the catastrophe. Reports indicate that in this realm, psychologists provided invaluable assistance to those affected by the attacks (see, for example, articles in the November 2001 issue of the American Psychological Association's Monitor on Psychology, which describe a range of psychologists' services).Some peace psychologists were among those who provided services to direct and indirect victims. Some others, however, have found themselves in a professional quandary, actively questioning how best to respond to terrorist attacks. Peace

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“…We need to move beyond the rational/irrational psychology in order to understand the Cuban frame of mind and to take steps to prevent other leaders from arriving at desperation caused by great power entrapment. Such a psychology would be both phenomenological-its goal would be putting oneself vicariously in the other's shoes (Blight, 1987(Blight, , 1990)-and triangular-its practitioners would be on the lookout for situations in which leaders of small, militarily threatened nations feel backed into a corer, optionless, abandoned by allies, and threatened by adversaries. What looks outwardly like suicide may feel like a last chance at honor or survival.…”

Section: Triangular Phenomenology: a Post-cold War Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

Triangular Mutual Security: Why the Cuban Missile Crisis Matters in a World beyond the Cold War

Belkin¹,

Blight²

1991

Political Psychology

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We argue that as the superpowers move closer together, they need to ensure that security concerns of Third World states are taken into account. Otherwise, Moscow and Washington may face risks to their own security. This imperative applies especially to times of crisis, when deals struck at the superpower level may exacerbate fears of states who see their security being bargained away, thus leading to dangerous reactions. We illustrate our argument by retelling the classic tale of the Cuban missile crisis. Our account, however, is triangular, because in addition to American and Soviet perceptions, the Cuban perspective is a focus of our analysis. Finally, we derive triangular lessons of the missile crisis using the theory of mutual security. KEY WORDS: Fidel Castro; Cuban missile crisis; positive sum; theory of mutual security. What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such .. . [and] the universalization of Western liberal Democracy as the final form of human government. (Fukuyama, 1989:4) This isn't the end of history, it's the return of history. (Mearsheimer, 1990) The Third World will be the scene of the most serious problems in coming years, because of the tremendous instability in those countries . . . Dreaming that there will be an end to revolutions, no matter what happens, is just dreaming. (Castro, 1990a) THE POST-COLD WAR IMPERATIVE: TRIANGULAR MUTUAL SECURITY In the wake of the first scene of the miraculous events in Eastern Europe in 1989, including the "velvet revolution" and the end of the European Cold War, Belkin and Blight we have witnessed a heretofore unthinkable revolution in East-West relations, with the United States and U.S.S.R. suddenly, if fitfully, constituting the greatest joint venture in the history of international politics. We do indeed appear to have entered the early phase of what Charles Krauthammer has called "the unipolar moment" (Krauthammer, 1991). Examples of East-West collaboration include choreographed maneuvering over the emotional and complex issues of German reunification; Soviet restraint after the American invasion of Panama; American restraint after the Soviet blockade of Lithuania; and Secretary of State James Baker's October, 1989, call for a mutual framework to replace worn out notions of containment and East-West competition: "We can move beyond containment to make the change toward better superpower relations more secure and less reversible. Our task is to find enduring points of mutual advantage that serve the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union" (Baker, 1989). Moreover, Baker and his Soviet counterpart, Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, now speak by telephone as often as a half-dozen times per week, often to work out common strategies on tough issues, and to arrange their travel schedules to permit as many face-to-face meetings as possible (Anonymous State Department official. Private conversation with authors). The name of the g...

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Toward a policy-relevant psychology of avoiding nuclear war: Lessons for psychologists from the Cuban missile crisis.

Cited by 28 publications

References 40 publications

The dynamics of inaction: Psychological factors inhibiting arms control activism.

The dynamics of inaction: Psychological factors inhibiting arms control activism.

Terrorism: A Peace Psychological Analysis

Triangular Mutual Security: Why the Cuban Missile Crisis Matters in a World beyond the Cold War

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