2020
DOI: 10.1086/710620
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Toward a Pluralist Account of the Imagination in Science

Abstract: Typically, the imagination in thought experiments has been taken to consist in mental images; we visualize the state of affairs described. A recent alternative from Fiora Salis and Roman Frigg maintains that it is only the propositional imagination that is necessary for the conduct of a thought experiment. I set out problems with these monistic accounts and develop a pluralist stance. Thought experiments appeal to a variety of our imaginative capacities, and we ought to focus on the function of particular thou… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…However, Meynell (2014) offers a Waltonian view of thought experiments which highlights the experiential imagination, arguing that if the make-believe account took imaginings to be of a propositional kind, then it would not be clear how this would differ from Norton's account that thought experiments are just arguments. See Murphy (2020b) for further discussion.…”
Section: Endnotesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, Meynell (2014) offers a Waltonian view of thought experiments which highlights the experiential imagination, arguing that if the make-believe account took imaginings to be of a propositional kind, then it would not be clear how this would differ from Norton's account that thought experiments are just arguments. See Murphy (2020b) for further discussion.…”
Section: Endnotesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This view has prompted challenges from those advocating a pluralist view of the nature of imagination in science. Murphy (2020b), who focuses on thought experiments, states that when we consider various examples and their role in scientific practice, different thought experiments invite different types of imagination and a philosophical account of imagination in science needs to be able to accommodate this. Mental imagery, Murphy suggests, may be especially useful in cases where understanding is the relevant epistemic output (this is further discussed below), or in instances where we are invited to imagine different perspectives on the same scenario to consider what an observer would see.…”
Section: The Nature Of Imaginationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…62 Of course, this way of speaking doesn't imply that imagination in science works exactly the same way as it does in other contexts. For further discussions, see Stuart (2018), French (2020), Murphy (2020), and Salis and Frigg (2020). 63 For surveys see, for instance, Friend (2007), Kroon and Voltolini (2018), and Salis (2013).…”
Section: Non-concrete Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is an exciting recent literature on creativity and the imagination in science, seeAnscomb (2021),Breitenbach (2020),French (2020aFrench ( , 2020b,Hills and Bird (2018), Langland-Hassan (2020),Murphy (2021),Salis and Frigg (2020), Sánchez-Dorado (2020),Shevlin (2021), andStuart (2019).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%