Toward a Causal Model of Military Coups d'Etat

Zimmermann, Ekkart

doi:10.1177/0095327x7900500304

Cited by 17 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…Legitimacy, defined as the government’s rightful rule and citizens’ willingness to obey them, has long been argued to be an important influence on coup activity (Belkin & Schofer, 2003; Finer, 1988; Gilley, 2009; Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009; Lindberg & Clark, 2008; McGowan, 2005; Welch, 1970; Zimmerman, 1979). Overthrowing a legitimate government is unwise since citizens are unlikely to support a coup and the subsequent leaders that undertook the endeavor.…”

Section: Coup Risk and Women In Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Right “Man” for the Job? The Influence of Gender on Civil–Military Friction

Schroeder

Powell

2017

Armed Forces & Society

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The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of women in politics on the risk of a coup d’état. Previous research indicates that the relationship between female political leaders and security is dependent on the office she holds. Subsequently, we expect female legislators to have a different influence than a female chief executive on the likelihood of a coup. We argue that a higher level of female representation reduces the risk of a coup d’état. However, we assert that a female chief executive has a different effect and increases coup risk. Using data covering 160 states over the years 1952 to 2009, our empirical tests provide support for our expectations. All else being equal, increased levels of women in parliament lead to a substantial drop in coup likelihood. However, the argument that a female chief executive will be more coup prone is not fully supported in our findings.

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Section: Coup Risk and Women In Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Right “Man” for the Job? The Influence of Gender on Civil–Military Friction

Schroeder

Powell

2017

Armed Forces & Society

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“…Historical examples include the coups in Bangladesh in 1975, 1982(Baxter, 1997), in Pakistan in 1977and 1979(Talbot, 1999), in Thailand in 1971, 1973, and 1977(Chuto, 1987, and in Fiji in 1979(Narayan and Prasad, 2007; see also Lal, 1990).…”

Section: Studies On Property Rights and Coupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Global coup events have led into situations that either prolong economic underdevelopment (Zimmerman, 1979) or produce no effect on economic growth in developing states.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Determinants of Coup d’État Events 1970—90: The Role of Property Rights Protection

Tusalem

2010

International Political Science Review

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Existing research on the political-economic determinants of coup d'état events has not explored the role of property rights protection in decreasing the likelihood of their global and regional incidence. Case studies confirm that the military institutions of the developing world began to represent elite class values that reacted adversely to state attempts at the redistribution of wealth and the expropriation of property after the 1970s. Thus far, no empirical analysis has tested the assertions made by these cases. Using Binary Times Series Cross-Section models from the period 1970-90, this article investigates the impact of the Contract Intensive Money ratio and International Country Risk Guide measures, which are tapped as property rights proxy variables, on decreasing the likelihood of a coup. The findings show that developing states that secure their property rights (as a function of these measures) are more likely to experience a decreased likelihood of a coup. The effect of property rights protection on the decreased likelihood of a coup shows statistical significance in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The results hold true even when the global model is subjected to a sensitivity analysis where lagged coup events over a six-year period are included as a control variable.

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“…Martin Needler (1966: 616-26) had performed some early statistical analyses but Putnam's study of military intervention was far more comprehensive and sophisticated. Although Schmitter (1971: 425-506), Jackman (1976Jackman ( : 1078, and others later used quantitative techniques to examine the policy consequences of military regimes and Thompson (1975: 441-59) investigated the causes of one specific form of military intervention, the coup d'etat, to date, no superior quantitative analysis of the causes of varying Latin American military intervention levels yet has appeared to compare with Putnam's. Indeed, in the 1980s Putnam's research conclusions continue to be cited and discussed regularly in the military politics literature (Zimmermann, 1979: 398-99; Moten, 1979: 708;Francis, 1980: 45).…”

Section: Putnam's Analysis and The Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Social Mobilization, Military Tradition and Current Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Testing Putnam's Major Conclusions

Ruhl

1982

Western Political Quarterly

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published the first sophisticated~L quantitative study of Latin American military behavior in 1967. NoR subsequent statistical analysis of Latin American politics has been more widely cited, praised, or reprinted; moreover, no superior quantitative research on the causes of military intervention has emerged during the last fourteen years. Indeed, many textbooks on Latin American politics now commonly state Putnam's two major conclusions as verified empirical truths; students are taught to accept as proven facts the propositions that higher social mobilizationl levels inhibit military intervention and that traditionally noninterventionist military institutions are likely to remain so. More recent theoretical works by Huntington (1968), O'Donnell (1973O'Donnell ( , 1976, and others, however, have cast considerable doubt on both of these assumed relationships. In addition, the imposition of military rule during the 1970s by formerly noninterventionist armed forces in highly socially mobilized Uruguay and Chile indicates the existence of some anomalous cases which seem to contradict Putnam's conclusions.In short, both theoretical revisions and Latin America's actual experiences since 1967 suggest the value of reexamining Putnam's two most generally accepted findings by means of a new quantitative test. This paper will review Putnam's research, discuss the theoretical and empirical justifications for a reanalysis, and retest Putnam's principal propositions using comparable methodological procedures and a new data set. The final portion of the paper will offer both substantive and methodological conclusions on the issues raised by comparing the two sets of test results. PUTNAM'S ANALYSIS AND THE LITERATUREQuantitative studies were quite new to Latin American politics in 1967. Martin Needler (1966: 616-26) had performed some early statistical analyses but Putnam's study of military intervention was far more comprehensive and sophisticated.

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Toward a Causal Model of Military Coups d'Etat

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

Right “Man” for the Job? The Influence of Gender on Civil–Military Friction

Right “Man” for the Job? The Influence of Gender on Civil–Military Friction

Determinants of Coup d’État Events 1970—90: The Role of Property Rights Protection

Social Mobilization, Military Tradition and Current Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Testing Putnam's Major Conclusions

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