Tournaments Without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records

Vidal, Jordi Blanes i; Nossol, Mareike

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1346472

Cited by 28 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…A large part of this volatility is caused by common shocks (weather, holidays, advertising campaigns on national television, etc. ), 6 which renders an overview of all the events related to the experiment. In the first experimental period, all stores were assigned to one of the two experimental treatments, either bonus or feedback.…”

Section: Experimental Set-up and Data Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

et al. 2009

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager and a large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding.JEL Classification: C93, J16, M52

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Section: Experimental Set-up and Data Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

et al. 2009

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“…Under flat‐rate incentives, Mas and Moretti () find that there are positive productivity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift. Blanesi Vidal and Nossol (), by using a firm level data set find that individual disclosure of relative standing increased long term average productivity by about 6% without affecting the quality of production.…”

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confidence: 94%

The Role of Goals and Feedback in Incentivizing Performance

Akin

Karagözoğlu

2015

Manage Decis Econ

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In this paper, we experimentally investigate how goal setting and feedback policies affect work performance. In particular, we study the effects of (i) absolute performance feedback, (ii) self‐specified goals, and (iii) exogenous goals and relative performance feedback. Our results show that the average performance of the subjects who are provided self‐performance feedback is 11% lower than the ones who obtain no feedback. Moreover, setting a non‐binding personal goal does not affect performance. Finally, assigning an exogenous goal and providing relative performance feedback decreases performance by 8%. We discuss the insights our findings offer for the optimal design of goal setting and feedback mechanisms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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“…The choice of incentive schemes is guided by rank incentives and tournaments being widely used to provide incentives in organizations, and yet field evidence on their effects is scarce . Theory highlights how rank incentives can affect productivity if individuals have status concerns (Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi, ; Besley and Ghatak, ), and a small empirical literature shows that providing information on rankings without prizes impacts productivity when individuals work independently (Barankay, ; Delfgaauw et al., ; Clark, Masclet, and Villeval, ; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol, ; Kosfeld and Neckermann, ). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first field experiment designed to evaluate the effect of rank incentives on team composition and productivity in a real workplace.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Team Incentives: Evidence From a Firm Level Experiment

Bandiera

Barankay

Rasul

2013

Journal of the European Economic Association

264

193

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Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team‐based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers’ effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. Introducing rank incentives however reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a tournament increases it by 24%. Both effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments only increase the productivity of teams at the top. We interpret these results through a theoretical framework that makes precise when the provision of team‐based incentives crowds out the productivity‐enhancing effect of social connections under team production.

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Tournaments Without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records

Cited by 28 publications

References 31 publications

Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

The Role of Goals and Feedback in Incentivizing Performance

Team Incentives: Evidence From a Firm Level Experiment

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