Torture, Dignity, and Humiliation

Typically, philosophers analysing well-being’s nature maintain three claims. First, that well-being has essential properties. Second, that the concept of well-being circumscribes those properties. Third, that well-being theories should capture them exhaustively and exclusively. This predominant position is called well-being monism. In opposition, contextualists argue that no overarching concept of well-being referring to a universally applicable well-being standard exists. Such a standard would describe what is good, bad, and neutral, for us without qualification. Instead, well-being research is putatively about several central phenomena. If several phenomena are central, a proliferation of concurrently acceptable well-being theories and operationalisations is expected. However, contextualists are challenged to explain how those analysing well-being are not systematically talking past each other. In this paper, I address that challenge. The upshot is that contextualist well-being theories can be justifiably context-sensitive and applied to tailor-made policy-making efforts. I illustrate the benefits by connecting contextualism to the capability approach.

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Prison as a Torturous Institution

Wolfendale¹

2020

Res Phil.

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Philosophers working on torture have largely failed to address the widespread use of torture in the U.S. prison system. Drawing on a victim-focused definition of torture, I argue that the U.S. prison system is a torturous institution in which direct torture occurs (the use of solitary confinement) and in which torture is allowed to occur through the toleration of sexual assault of inmates and the conditions of mass incarceration. The use and toleration of torture expresses and reinforces the moral exclusion of those subjected to it, particularly African Americans. Importantly, this moral exclusion and the experience of torture may be created and reinforced through institutional practices independently of the intentions of individuals acting within those institutions. By prioritizing torture victims' experiences and severing the link between torture and intention, my account forces a recognition that, far from being inconsistent with U.S. values, torture is deeply embedded within U.S. institutions.The torture debate in philosophy has focused almost exclusively on the use of torture in the context of terrorism. Authors defending the possibility of justified torture, such as Jeff McMahan (2018), Fritz Allhof (2012, and Uwe Steinhoff (2013), often make use of hypothetical cases such as 'ticking bomb' scenarios to defend the view that torture could in rare cases be justified. Other authors have critiqued the use of these hypotheticals for being unrealistic, misleading, and irrelevant to the realities of torture. 1 This back-and-forth between defenders of torture in ticking bomb cases and critics of such cases has effectively defined the contours of the torture debate in America since 9/11. This debate is characterized by an individualized narrative of torture that renders torture simultaneously hypervisible by asking us to consider whether torturing this person (whether real or hypothetical) is permissible yet makes the reality and true scope of torture invisible.

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Torture, Dignity, and Humiliation

Cited by 3 publications

References 10 publications

Victims of Torture

Victims of Torture

Well-Being Contextualism and Capabilities

Prison as a Torturous Institution

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