Tortoise and Hares Consensus: The Meshcash Framework for Incentive-Compatible, Scalable Cryptocurrencies

Bentov, Iddo; Hubáček, Pavel; Moran, Tal; Nadler, Asaf

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-78086-9_9

Cited by 16 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Different aspects of incentives in Bitcoin were studied in [10,12,17,22,24,34,38,45,48] and incentive compatibility for blockchain protocols was studied in the context of a few protocols, see e.g., [6,14,53]. With respect to studying the participation in the core blockchain protocol, Kroll et al in [34] show that a certain modeling of the Bitcoin protocol is a Nash equilibrium, while Eyal and Sirer in [24] show that Bitcoin is not incentive compatible because of a type of attack called selfish mining that works for any level of computational power (for Nash equilibrium and incentive compatibility definition see related work Section 1.2).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition-safe equilibria with virtual payoffs

Kiayias

Stouka

2021

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition-safe equilibria with virtual payoffs

Kiayias

Stouka

2021

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies

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“…In an attempt to increase throughput, some recent DLT's have replaced the blockchain with a DAG, a directed acyclic graph. This approach is used in IOTA [12] and other new protocols; see [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. DAG based protocols reach consensus on a partially ordered log of transactions, which in turn, allow the log to have "width" and increase the throughput of the system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Properties of the Tangle for Uniform Random and Random Walk Tip Selection

Kuśmierz¹,

Sanders²,

Penzkofer³

et al. 2019

2019 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)

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The growing number of applications for distributed ledger technologies is driving both industry and academia to solve the limitations of blockchain, particularly its scalability issues. Recent distributed ledger technologies have replaced the blockchain linear structure with a more flexible directed acyclic graph in an attempt to accommodate a higher throughput. Despite the fast-growing diffusion of directed acyclic graph based distributed ledger technologies, researchers lack a basic understanding of their behavior. In this paper we analyze the Tangle, a directed acyclic graph that is used (with certain modifications) in various protocols such as IOTA, Byteball, Avalanche or SPECTRE.Our contribution is threefold. First, we run simulations in a continuous-time model to examine tip count stability and cumulative weight evolution while varying the rate of incoming transactions. In particular we confirm analytical predictions on the number of tips with uniform random tip selection strategy. Second, we show how different tip selection algorithms affect the growth of the Tangle. Moreover, we explain these differences by analyzing the spread of exit probabilities of random walks. Our findings confirm analytically derived predictions and provide novel insights on the different phases of growth of cumulative weight as well as on the average time difference for a transaction to receive its first approval when using distinct tip selection algorithms. Lastly, we analyze simulation overhead and performance as a function of Tangle size and compare results for different tip selection algorithms.

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“…DAG. Since the common data-structure in any blockchain application is the ledger, several systems incorporated a directedacyclic graph to record the client transactions [3,6,37,54,55]. As a blockchain application expects a single order for all the transactions across all the replicas, so a DAG-based design allows replicas working on non-conflicting transactions to simultaneously record multiple transactions.…”

Section: Alternative Blockchain Architecturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Permissioned Blockchain Through the Looking Glass: Architectural and Implementation Lessons Learned

Gupta¹,

Rahnama²,

Sadoghi³

2019

Preprint

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Since the inception of Bitcoin, the distributed and database community has shown interest in the design of efficient blockchain systems. At the core of any blockchain application is a Byzantine-Fault Tolerant (Bft) protocol that helps a set of replicas reach an agreement on the order of a client request. Initial blockchain applications (like Bitcoin) attain very low throughput and are computationally expensive. Hence, researchers moved towards the design of permissioned blockchain systems that employ classical Bft protocols, such as PBFT, to reach consensus. However, existing permissioned blockchain systems still attain low throughputs (of the order 10K txns/s). As a result, existing works blame this low throughput on the associated Bft protocol and expend resources in developing optimizes protocols.We believe such blames only depict a one-sided story. In specific, we raise a simple question: can a well-crafted system based on a classical Bft protocol outperform a modern protocol? We show that designing such a well-crafted system is possible and illustrate cases where a three-phase protocol can outperform a singlephase protocol. Further, we dissect a permissioned blockchain system and state several factors that affect its performance. We also design a high-throughput yielding permissioned blockchain system, ResilientDB, that employs parallel pipelines to balance tasks at a replica, and provides guidelines for future designs.

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Tortoise and Hares Consensus: The Meshcash Framework for Incentive-Compatible, Scalable Cryptocurrencies

Cited by 16 publications

References 17 publications

Coalition-safe equilibria with virtual payoffs

Coalition-safe equilibria with virtual payoffs

Properties of the Tangle for Uniform Random and Random Walk Tip Selection

Permissioned Blockchain Through the Looking Glass: Architectural and Implementation Lessons Learned

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