How does the mind/brain differentiate fact from fancy, perception from inference? How do we distinguish creating a novel tune from remembering someone else's melody? How do we discriminate memories of what we witnessed at the scene of a crime from memories of a co-witness's description of what happened? The central premise of the source-monitoring framework (SMF) is that the origins of our sensations, thoughts, images, and feelings are not abstractly and unambiguously specified and labelled a pri-ori but rather are inferred by the mind/brain (usually very rapidly and without conscious reflection) on the basis of their content in the course of our experiencing them. Most of the time the inferences are correct, but often the accessed information is insufficient to support a source attribution and occasionally a mental event from one source is misat-tributed to another. In the realm of gusta-tory experience, for example, inputs from the nose are routinely misattributed to the tongue; lacking olfaction it is reportedly difficult to distinguish an apple from a potato, but when one savours an orange pippin the lovely flavour sensations seem to come from the mouth. As another perceptual example, what we see, hear, feel, or smell can be influenced by our expectations; if you are waiting for Don to telephone and your iPhone rings you may mistake Patrick's voice for Don's, especially if the connection quality is poor or there is lots of background noise or you are momentarily distracted as you take the call. Research and theorizing informed by the SMF has focused primarily on mental events that are attributed to memory. 1 The majority of work on the SMF has had to do with mental events that are attributed to memory for specific experiences in the personal past, that is, to episodic memory. A smaller literature informed by (or at least consistent with) the SMF has examined attributions to knowledge or what Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, and Lindsay (2012) recently termed (in reference to comedian Stephen Colbert's term) "truthiness." Thus the purview of the current chapter is applied implications of source monitoring in the domains of autobiographical memory and belief. Before discussing those applied issues I will provide some general background on the SMF (see Mitchell & Johnson, 2009, and Lindsay, 2008, for more extensive exegeses of the SMF itself).