Tool Integration with the Evidential Tool Bus

Cruanes, Simon; Hamon, Grégoire; Owre, Sam; Shankar, Natarajan

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35873-9_18

Cited by 47 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…This means that, since set c and get c are (total) mathematical functions, given the same input arguments, they always return the same result. 6 This formalization does not imply that an FMU cannot use mechanisms such as value caching to improve efficiency of the implementation. This can still be done in an imperative implementation in C, provided these mechanisms do not alter the semantics.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinate composition of FMUs for co-simulation

Broman

Brooks

Greenberg³

et al. 2013

2013 Proceedings of the International Conference on Embedded Software (EMSOFT)

101

158

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinate composition of FMUs for co-simulation

Broman

Brooks

Greenberg³

et al. 2013

2013 Proceedings of the International Conference on Embedded Software (EMSOFT)

101

158

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…When there are less new shapes, however, some shapes cannot be paired and, subsequently, former proof tasks are lost. 6 …”

Section: Matching Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The why3session command-line tool allows to copy/move proof attempts done with one prover to another prover or to compare results of di erent provers. 6 Conclusions, Related Work, and Perspectives…”

Section: Environment Changesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Evidential Tool Bus is a rst step towards this idea by J. Rushby in 2005 [13]. Recently, Cruanes, Hamon, Owre, and Shankar [6] presented a formal setting on how several independent tools can cooperate and exchange proofs on such a tool bus. A similar e ort is the goal of D. Miller's ProofCert project 7 , where a general framework for a common proof format is proposed [11].…”

Section: Environment Changesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Preserving User Proofs across Specification Changes

Bobot

Filliâtre

Marché

et al. 2014

Verified Software: Theories, Tools, Experiments

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Abstract. In the context of deductive program veri cation, both the speci cation and the code evolve as the veri cation process carries on. For instance, a loop invariant gets strengthened when additional properties are added to the speci cation. This causes all the related proof obligations to change; thus previous user veri cations become invalid. Yet it is often the case that most of previous proof attempts (goal transformations, calls to interactive or automated provers) are still directly applicable or are easy to adjust. In this paper, we describe a technique to maintain a proof session against modi cation of veri cation conditions. This technique is implemented in the Why3 platform. It was successfully used in developing more than a hundred veri ed programs and in keeping them up to date along the evolution of Why3 and its standard library. It also helps out with changes in the environment, e.g. prover upgrades.

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“…The idea is that the full resources of automated deduction within a formal verification system become available for the purpose of evaluating the argument of a safety case. The description in [10] envisaged augmenting a formal verification system to support this activity (chiefly by providing ways to manage the narrative comments justifying informal proof steps), but a recent alternative is to use a framework such as the "Evidential Tool Bus" (ETB) [11], which is designed to assemble formal claims from multiple sources.…”

Section: Logic Doubtmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logic and Epistemology in Safety Cases

Rushby

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. A safety case must resolve concerns of two different kinds: how complete and accurate is our knowledge about aspects of the system (e.g., its requirements, environment, implementation, hazards) and how accurate is our reasoning about the design of the system, given our knowledge. The first of these is a form of epistemology and requires human experience and insight, but the second can, in principle, be reduced to logic and then checked and automated using the technology of formal methods. We propose that reducing epistemic doubt is the main challenge in safety cases, and discuss ways in which this might be achieved.

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Tool Integration with the Evidential Tool Bus

Cited by 47 publications

References 26 publications

Determinate composition of FMUs for co-simulation

Determinate composition of FMUs for co-simulation

Preserving User Proofs across Specification Changes

Logic and Epistemology in Safety Cases

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