Too much, too fast? The sources of banks’ opposition to European banking structural reforms

Abstract

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Network effects in the formation of the financial industry's regulatory preferences in the European Union

“…It is no surprise that scholars have come to expect a race to the bottom, or socalled "trading down" on financial regulation. At the same time, however, concerns over international competitiveness also shape industry actors' regulatory 14 Keller (2018); Spendzharova et al (2016); Chalmers (2015Chalmers ( , 2019; Eising, Rasch, and Rozbicka (2014); Woll (2013). 15 James and Christopoulos (2017).…”

“…7Baker (2010); Carpenter and Moss (2014); Chalmers (2019); Keller (2018); Lall (2011); Spendzharova et al (2016); Woll (2013); Young (2012). …”

“…14Keller (2018); Spendzharova et al (2016); Chalmers (2015, 2019); Eising, Rasch, and Rozbicka (2014); Woll (2013). …”

“…57Broscheid and Coen (2007); Furlong (1997); Klüver (2013); McKay and Yackee (2007); Nixon, Howard, and DeWitt (2002); Pagliari and Young (2014); Rasmussen and Carroll (2014); Selling (2016); Spendzharova et al (2016); Yackee and Yackee (2006). …”

Regulatory cascading: Limitations of policy design in European banking structural reforms

“…By contrast, analysts have pointed out that the proposed EU banking structural reforms will generate high compliance costs and require a substantial redesign of banks' business models. The high adjustment costs are expected to have especially adverse effects on universal banks in Europe, which rely on both deposit-taking and market-making activities (Deloitte, 2015;Hardie & Macartney, 2016;Spendzharova, Versluis, Flöthe, & Radulova, 2016).…”