Too Much Playing Games – A Response to Kretchmar

Abstract

Scott Kretchmar recently put forth a new definition of what it is to play a game. Unfortunately, it must be rejected. In this paper, I will show that this new definition is far too broad by discussing an activity that is not an instance of playing a game but is wrongfully ruled as one on this new definition. KEYWORDSGame definitions; nature of games; Suits; Kretchmar; gameplay Recently, Scott Kretchmar published a useful critique of the classic Suitsian definition of what it is to play a game, and then went one step further by offering up a new definition of what it is to play a game. While there is merit to his work, the result is flawed. In this brief paper, I will show that Kretchmar's new definition of what it is to play a game is too broad in that it incorrectly classifies certain activities as game-playing activities and therefore must be rejected.To start things off, we should put on the board the classic Suitsian definition, as well as Kretchmar's new definition. As should be familiar to most readers of this journal, the classic Suitsian definition is as follows:To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude]. I also offer the following simpler and, so to speak, more portable version of the above: playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles. (Suits 1978, 41) And now Kretchmar's new definition:To play a game is to attempt, through effort, chance, or both, to solve a natural or constructed problem; where relationships between its means (lusory means) and ends (lusory goals) provide valid challenges; where inherent constraints (regulative rules), together with any imposed limitations (constitutive rules), and interpretive understandings (prevailing ethos), specify the goals and means permitted for reaching those goals; and where these specifications and permissions are accepted in order to encounter, for either one's use or enjoyment, the problem thereby created (lusory attitude). (Kretchmar 2019, 10) Kretchmar also offers a 'Portable Version' in addition to the 'Unabridged Version' quoted above. This shorter definition is as follows: 'To play a game is to attempt to solve a gratuitous problem'.While there are multiple changes, arguably the most important is the difference in status of constitutive rules. The Suitsian definition requires that there be constitutive