2011
DOI: 10.1177/1465116511399162
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Too big to run? Analysing the impact of enlargement on the speed of EU decision-making

Abstract: The article analyses how enlargements affect the speed of European Union (EU) decision-making. In line with rationalist theories of group choice, we argue that enlargements increase the costs of organizing decisions, i.e. transaction costs. Increasing transaction costs, in turn, slow down EU law-making. We test this theory by estimating Cox regression models that incorporate time-varying covariates on all directives, regulations and decisions submitted by the European Commission between 1976 and 2006. In contr… Show more

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Cited by 59 publications
(52 citation statements)
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References 38 publications
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“…In contrast to much of the existing academic literature (in particular, Hertz and Leuffen [2011]; König [2007]; König and Bräuninger [2002]; Leuffen [2006]; Leuffen and Hertz [2010]; Settembri [2007]; see also Avery et al [2009]; Plechanovova [2011]; Thomson [2009]; Zimmer et al [2005]; for more nuanced positions, see ; Kelemen et al [2014]) and the dominant public discourse, 4 I find that the Eastern enlargement has not had a major negative effect on the decision-making capacity of the EU. If anything, the speed of decision-making for some important types of legal acts has actually increased, and more legislation is being produced after 2004 than in the 10 years preceding the accession of the first post-communist countries to the EU.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In contrast to much of the existing academic literature (in particular, Hertz and Leuffen [2011]; König [2007]; König and Bräuninger [2002]; Leuffen [2006]; Leuffen and Hertz [2010]; Settembri [2007]; see also Avery et al [2009]; Plechanovova [2011]; Thomson [2009]; Zimmer et al [2005]; for more nuanced positions, see ; Kelemen et al [2014]) and the dominant public discourse, 4 I find that the Eastern enlargement has not had a major negative effect on the decision-making capacity of the EU. If anything, the speed of decision-making for some important types of legal acts has actually increased, and more legislation is being produced after 2004 than in the 10 years preceding the accession of the first post-communist countries to the EU.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…The existing academic literature offers conflicting accounts. Some studies argue that enlargement has or would slow down decision-making (Hertz and Leuffen 2011;König 2007). On the other hand Golub (2007) finds no effect of enlargements (his data do not include the Eastern enlargement) and Klüver and Sagarzazu (2013) report no effect of the number of member states and a negative effect of within-Council ideological diversity on legislative duration.…”
Section: Legislative Durationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In EU decision making, widening membership through enlargement will therefore augment the costs of information gathering and bargaining, and new member states will add to the costs of negotiating legislation under codecision (Hertz & Leuffen, 2011;Rasmussen, 2011, p. 52). For the colegislators, transaction costs of accommodating more diverse policy preferences arise in particular from the need to coordinate internal positions within their respective organizations.…”
Section: Theorizing the Use Of Early Agreementsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The percentage of codecision procedures which are concluded early has increased rapidly since the possibility to conclude at first reading was introduced in 1999. (42) 14% (61) 5% (23) 100% (447) 7th EP (until 22/10/13) 81% (257) 8% (26) 8% (26) 3% (8) 100% ( (Hertz and Leuffen 2011;Rasmussen 2011, p. 52), including the costs which the colegislators face when coordinating their positions within their respective organisations. Using informal arenas may reduce these costs-in particular, as the adoption of an EA only requires a simple majority of votes in Parliament-and may therefore be particularly attractive for actors when they are faced with an increase in the number of negotiation participants (see Reh et al 2013Reh et al , p. 1123.…”
Section: Capturing Early Agreementsmentioning
confidence: 99%