Tonking a theory of content: an inferentialist rejoinder

Abstract

If correct, Christopher Peacocke's [20] "manifestationism without verificationism," would explode the dichotomy between realism and inferentialism in the contemporary philosophy of language. I first explicate Peacocke's theory, defending it from a criticism of Neil Tennant's. This involves devising a recursive definition for grasp of logical contents along the lines Peacocke suggests. Unfortunately though, the generalized account reveals the Achilles' heel of the whole theory. By inventing a new logical operator with the introduction rule for the existential quantifier and the elimination rule for the universal quantifier, I am able to show that Peacocke's theory only avoids verificationism to the extent that it does not satisfy manifestationism. * I must thank Crispin Wright for encouraging me to develop the main argument of the paper, Neil Tennant for both encouragement and giving me permission to quote from his unpublished manuscript (Tennant [30]), and Jaroslav Peregrin for (perhaps inadvertantly) helping me to see clearly the connection between Peacocke's work and the current debate over inferentialism. I also need to thank