Tobacco industry interference with tobacco control policies in Poland: legal aspects and industry practices: Table 1

Abstract

BackgroundSince 2006, when Poland ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), there have been efforts to improve tobacco control regulation in the country. At the same time, at the European Union level, Poland took part in discussions over revision of the Tobacco Tax Directive and the Tobacco Products Directive. This study aims to explore the tobacco industry's tactics to interfere with the creation of those policies.MethodsAnalysis of 257 documents obtained through freedom of information request.ResultsWe identified three means that the tobacco industry used to interfere with tobacco control policies: creating a positive attitude, expressing a will to be a part of the policymaking process, and exerting pressure. We found that those tactics have often been used unethically, with the industry providing the government with ready legislation proposals, overstating its contribution to the economy and the government revenues, misrepresenting the illicit cigarette problem and misusing scientific evidence. The industry also used legal threats, including use of bilateral trade agreements, against implementation of tobacco control measures. The companies lobbied together directly and through third parties, with the cigarette excise tax structure being the only area of disagreement among the companies. The industry also pushed the Polish government to challenge tobacco control policies in countries with stronger public policy standards, including UK display bans and the Australian plain-packaging law.ConclusionsFrom an object of regulation, the tobacco industry in Poland became a partner with the government in legislative work. Implementation of provisions of Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC could prevent further industry interference.

Illicit Tobacco in Lithuania: A Cross-Sectional Survey

“…There is a long and well-described tradition of the TI to use the threat of the illicit trade to compromise such evidence-based policies as tobacco tax and price regulations [ 5 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 ], plain packaging [ 32 , 53 ], pictorial warnings [ 49 ], point-of-sale display bans [ 49 ], marketing regulations [ 54 ], flavour bans [ 49 , 55 ], pack size restrictions [ 56 ]. TI in particular often claims that taxes on tobacco products drive the illicit trade [ 5 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 ], although there is a vast amount of evidence showing a limited relationship between higher tobacco prices and size of the illicit market [ 14 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 ].…”

Analysis of the legislative process related to the implementation of graphic health warning labels on tobacco products in South Korea

“…The industry has also asserted that the images violate freedom of expression, trademark property rights 24 and even freedom of religion 23 . All of these tactics have delayed implementation of tobacco control policies and undermined their effectiveness 25,26 . In India, GHWL implementation was delayed by both international and domestic tobacco companies 27 ; GHWLs have yet to be implemented in the United States because of lawsuits filed by the tobacco industry 28 .…”

Japan Tobacco International: To ‘be the most successful and respected tobacco company in the world’

“…Industry opposition extends to global governance and challenges to the FCTC (WHO, 2003 ), which are well-documented. Strategies have included lobbying national FCTC delegations and governments; arguing that the treaty would have negative economic impacts; raising doubts about the WHO’s mandate to develop a legally binding international agreement; and to propose less rigorous alternative agreements (Balwicki, Stokłosa, Balwicka-Szczyrba, & Tomczak, 2015 ; Mamudu, Hammond, & Glantz, 2008 ; Weishaar et al, 2012 ). Japan’s ratification of the treaty in 2004, (United Nations, 2016 ) given that the country is ‘an especially important player in the global governance regime under the FCTC in light of profound conflicts arising from its Minister of Finance’s on-going position as the controlling shareholder of Japan Tobacco Inc’ (Levin, 2016 ).…”