To search or not to search? The effects of UI benefit extension for the older unemployed

Kyyrä, Tomi; Ollikainen, Virve

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.03.004

Cited by 52 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…8 Studies for Sweden (Karlström et al 2008), the Netherlands (Borghans et al 2014, Lammers et al 2013), Finnland (Kyyrä and Ollikainen 2008), and Austria (Staubli, 2011) suggest that program substitution might be quantitatively important. See also the recent US study of Lindner (2016), who finds that higher UI benefits reduce DI application and the e↵ect is quantitatively large.…”

Section: Program Substitution? Ui and Other Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unemployment insurance and the labor market

Zweimüller

2018

Labour Economics

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The existing literature assumes that unemployment insurance (UI) a↵ects the labor market through the job finding rate of eligible workers. I argue that this focus is too narrow. I show evidence for UI e↵ects through three other margins: (i) search externalities; (ii) takeup of other welfare state programs; and (iii) job separations. This suggests that the analysis of optimal UI should take a more comprehensive view of how UI a↵ects the labor market.Keywords: Unemployment insurance, extended benefits, unemployment duration, unemployment inflow, layo↵s, disability insurance, optimal benefits. JEL Codes: J65, J63, J64. * Address: University of Zurich, CH-8000 Zurich, Switzerland; email josef.zweimueller@econ.uzh.ch. This paper was written for the Adam Smith Lecture at EALE 2017, St.Gallen, Switzerland. I want to thank the organizers for inviting me to give this lecture and for the opportunity to present my work in front of this great audience. The research discussed here would not have happened without the energy and enthusiasm of my co-authors. First and foremost, I am indebted to my long-term collaborator Rafael Lalive, who provided invaluable input for this research. With him I started working on the universe of the Austrian social security data (ASSD) in the late 1990s, a data set that many other researchers are using now. Special thanks go to Stefan Staubli with whom I have enjoyed working over the last years and whose expertise and work attitude were of tremendous help in all our projects. The research discussed here benefitted from the energetic input of Camille Landais, who initiated the market externality project. I am indebted to Lukas Inderbitzin who co-authored the paper on program substitution. The paper on UI and job separations is work in progress and I have the pleasure to work with Simon Jäger and Benjamin Schoefer on this project. Over the years, I could rely on the support of engaged and talented research assistants. Particular thanks go to Andreas Kettemann and Philippe Ruh, who were extremely helpful over the last years and who provided decisive input for the empirical evidence presented here. Thanks also to Damian Osterwalder and Dominik Eglo↵ for putting together the tables and graphs of the paper. I also thank Andreas Steinhauer and Andreas Haller for comments on an earlier version of this paper and Johanna Posch for checking the final version.

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Section: Program Substitution? Ui and Other Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unemployment insurance and the labor market

Zweimüller

2018

Labour Economics

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“…The impact of an extension of the entitlement period for Austria shows that one week of additional entitlement, on average, leads to 0.7 weeks of additional benefit claims for workers older than 50, while for workers in the age range of 40−50, the additional duration of unemployment insurance benefits is 0.35 weeks [8]. In Finland, one study on the effect of reducing the entitlement period notably shows a decrease in the unemployment duration for the older unemployed [9].…”

Section: Attractiveness Of Unemployment On Imposing Job Search Requirmentioning

confidence: 99%

Job search requirements for older unemployed workers

Bloemen¹

2016

izawol

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

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“…In practice, this scheme acts as an early retirement scheme for many unemployed workers, some of whom self-select themselves into the program. Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) show that the unemployment risk of private-sector workers at least doubles at the age threshold of this scheme, and Kyyrä and Ollikainen (2008) estimate that approximately one half of unemployed workers eligible for the benet extension withdraw from job search entirely.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%