To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems

Hassin, Refael; Haviv, Moshe

doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-0359-0

Cited by 829 publications

(629 citation statements)

References 152 publications

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“…The economic framework that we adopt here was first proposed by Mendelson [28], and further extended by Mendelson and Whang [29]. An extensive review of known results on customer behavior in queueing environments can be found in the book by Hassin and Haviv [19].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revenue Optimization for a Make-to-Order Queue in an Uncertain Market Environment

Besbes

Maglaras

2009

Operations Research

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We consider a revenue-maximizing make-to-order manufacturer that serves a market of price-and delaysensitive customers and operates in an environment in which the market size varies stochastically over time. A key feature of our analysis is that no model is assumed for the evolution of the market size. We analyze two main settings: (i) the size of the market is observable at any point in time; and (ii) the size of the market is not observable and hence cannot be used for decision making. We focus on high-volume systems that are characterized by large processing capacities and market sizes, and where the latter fluctuate on a slower timescale than that of the underlying production system dynamics. We develop an approach to tackle such problems that is based on an asymptotic analysis and that yields near-optimal policy recommendations for the original system via the solution of a stochastic fluid model. We consider a revenue maximizing make-to-order manufacturer that serves a market of price and delay sensitive customers and operates in an environment in which the market size varies stochastically over time. A key feature of our analysis is that no model is assumed for the evolution of the market size. We analyze two main settings: i) the size of the market is observable at any point in time; and ii) the size of the market is not observable and hence cannot be used for decision-making. We focus on high-volume systems that are characterized by large processing capacities and market sizes, and where the latter fluctuate on a slower time scale than that of the underlying production system dynamics. We develop an approach to tackle such problems that is based on an asymptotic analysis and that yields near-optimal policy recommendations for the original system via the solution of a stochastic fluid model.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revenue Optimization for a Make-to-Order Queue in an Uncertain Market Environment

Besbes

Maglaras

2009

Operations Research

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“…The results on the unobservable model appear originally in [6] while those on the observable case are from [23]. More comprehensive summaries appear, respectively, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 2 of [15].…”

Section: To Queue or Not To Queuementioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is only their aggregate behavior which leads to the completion of the model via determining the value of λ. Commencing with the seminal paper [23], this branch of research got much attention in the literature. A state of the art summary (until 2003) on it is given in [15]. Below we describe some of the main results and ideas in this field while considering a few key examples.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rather, we would like to give the flavor of the issues dealt with, while considering some of the most important queueing decision models. Note that we restrict ourselves to the case where customers are homogeneous with respect to their parameters C and R. Many models where this assumption is removed are also surveyed in [15]. We point out that as opposed to strict optimization problems, the homogeneous case is not a special case of the non-homogeneous case.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic Customer Behavior in a Single Server Queue

Haviv

2011

Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science

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The purpose of this article is to introduce the reader to the topic of strategic behavior of customers in queues. We assume that customers individually decide on issues such as whether or not to join the queue, whether or not to renege from a queue after waiting for a while, or whether or not to pay some fee in order to belong to a higher priority class. For some examples, we define the appropriate noncooperative games and look for their Nash equilibria. We restrict ourselves to M/M/1 queues with homogeneous customers (with respect to their cost/reward parameters).

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“…For analytical tractability, we assume limited waiting space in front of the service facilities. Hassin and Haviv (2003) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature dealing with the queue-joining behavior of consumers at service facilities in queueing systems. In this literature, consumers are rational decision makers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Herding in Queues with Waiting Costs: Rationality and Regret

Veeraraghavan

Debo

2011

M&SOM

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W e study how consumers with waiting cost disutility choose between two congested services of unknown service value. Consumers observe an imperfect private signal indicating which service facility may provide better service value as well as the queue lengths at the service facilities before making their choice. If more consumers choose the same service facility because of their private information, longer queues will form at that facility and indicate higher quality. On the other hand, a long queue also implies more waiting time. We characterize the equilibrium queue-joining behavior of arriving consumers and the extent of their learning from the queue information in the presence of such positive and negative externalities. We find that when the arrival rates are low, utility-maximizing rational consumers herd and join the longer queue, ignoring any contrary private information. We show that even when consumers treat queues as independently evolving, herd behavior persists with consumers joining longer queues above a threshold queue difference. However, if the consumers seek to minimize ex post regret when making their decisions, herd behavior may be dampened.

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To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems

Cited by 829 publications

References 152 publications

Revenue Optimization for a Make-to-Order Queue in an Uncertain Market Environment

Revenue Optimization for a Make-to-Order Queue in an Uncertain Market Environment

Strategic Customer Behavior in a Single Server Queue

Herding in Queues with Waiting Costs: Rationality and Regret

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