To Link or Not to Link? Agenda Change in International Bargaining

Abstract

Agendas shape the strategies states adopt in international bargaining and, therefore, the substantive nature of the resulting outcomes. They are also a dynamic feature of the process, as states add and subtract issues in order to shift the bargaining outcome in their favor. This article analyzes when and why states will use these different 'issue-linkage' strategies. Focusing on the effects of a successful agreement and the costs of failure, it highlights conditions under which states are likely to add or subtract issues from the bargaining agenda. It tests these arguments using an original dataset of the bargaining strategies states have adopted in climate-change negotiations. It concludes by highlighting the implications the argument has for understanding the outcomes of international negotiations.The agenda is a key part of all bargaining processes. It shapes the strategies actors adopt, as well as the substantive nature of any agreement that can be reached. It is not, however, simply an exogenous factor that structures bargaining interactions. It is dynamic and can change throughout the bargaining process as actors strategically manipulate the set of issues being negotiated in order to influence the resulting outcome. The use of such agenda-changing strategies is particularly prevalent in international bargaining, where institutions are rarely in place to set the bargaining agenda. Instead, states write and re-write that agenda for themselves.The study of 'issue linkage' provides important insights that can help us understand the role that the agenda plays in international bargaining. Analyzing issue linkage as a structure allows us to explore how the issues on the agenda influence states' strategies when bargaining over those issues, and the outcomes that result. Analyzing issue linkage as a strategy allows us to evaluate the bargaining agenda as something that can be strategically manipulated by states as they add and subtract issues from the discussion. Both aspects of issue linkage are key for understanding international bargaining processes.However, while we have a fairly robust understanding of issue linkage as a bargaining structure, we have relatively little understanding of issue linkage as a bargaining strategy. 1 This limits our understanding of how and why the bargaining agenda comes to be structured in a particular way, and also limits our ability to understand the outcomes that result. I seek to address this problem by explaining when and why states will try to change the bargaining agenda as a part of their overarching bargaining strategy. By doing so, our ability to understand the agenda as a dynamic feature of international bargaining processes is increased.

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