To Devolve or Not To Devolve? Welfare Reform in the States

Abstract

This article analyzes variation in the degree to which states have responded to the devolution of welfare at the federal level by devolving authority over welfare policy to local government. I find that to the extent that states have devolved authority to lower levels of government, they tend to be states that already had a high degree of involvement of local government in welfare provision. In states without this record of local government involvement, the devolution that has occurred has not generated greater involvement of local government, but rather responsibility has been devolved to regional entities with ties to workforce development and with a substantial degree of business involvement. As states gain increasing authority over a redistributive policy, they may begin to treat it as a subset of a larger developmental policy-workforce development.

Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of Local Political Values on TANF Sanctioning

“…The most common form is exemplified in the actions of 14 states, which devolve policy authority to county governments (Gainsborough 2003). Ten of these states previously shared AFDC administrative duties with counties.…”

“…In states with the greatest amount of second-order devolution, counties gain substantial control over spending (through block grants). They enjoy broad discretion over the use of TANF work requirements, sanctions, time limits, and one-time diversion payments (Gainsborough 2003).…”

“…Their membership comprises both public and private officials. The exact rules for board composition vary from state to state, but most of the six states require that at least half of the board's members come from the local business community (Gainsborough 2003). These boards have power over TANF policy, but the extent of that power varies.…”

“…What is perhaps less often appreciated about welfare reform under TANF is that devolution of authority from the federal government to state governments has been accompanied by a significant decentralization of policy-making authority within states (Gainsborough 2003). The TANF program's emphasis on flexible services and sanctioning virtually ensures that decision making is pushed downward to local implementers, including case managers, who serve as the primary streetlevel bureaucrats in the new world of welfare service delivery (Ridzi 2004;Riccucci 2005;Lurie 2006).…”

“…This is critical to TANF's success, supporters assert, because employment barriers are most effectively identified and addressed by local decision makers who best understand the needs of their poor and the resources available to them in the community (Weissert 2000;Gainsborough 2003). However, the increase in local discretion that accompanies decentralization enables local policy makers, agency managers, and frontline workers to use their discretion for other purposes, including the advancement of political goals.…”