To be fair

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

2017

Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three fairness paradoxes. We demonstrate that division methods from apportionment theory, which has hitherto been ignored by philosophical theories of fairness, can be used to provide fair division for indivisible goods without weighted lotteries and without fairness paradoxes.

Section: Philosophical Theories Of Fairness and Hooker’s Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Philosophical Theories Of Fairness and Hooker’s Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Dividing the indivisible

Wintein¹,

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

2017

“…We introduce the claims approach and the games approach to fair division and explain that both approaches can be used to model fair division problems such as Problem I and II. Ever since Broome's seminal paper on fairness (Broome 1990), fair division problems are modelled as claims problems in the philosophical literature (see Hooker 2005;Saunders 2010;Tomlin 2012;Curtis 2014or Piller 2017 for an overview). However, by drawing on O'Neill (1982), we observe that the very same fair division problems can also be modelled as cooperative games.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theories of Fairness and Aggregation

Wintein

2018

Erkenn

We investigate the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems from the perspective of cooperative game theory and Broomean theories of fairness. Paseau and Saunders (Utilitas 27:460-469, 2015) proved that no non-trivial theory of fairness can be aggregative and conclude that theories of fairness are therefore problematic, or at least incomplete. We observe that there are theories of fairness, particularly those that are based on cooperative game theory, that do not face the problem of non-aggregativity. We use this observation to argue that the universal claim that no non-trivial theory of fairness can guarantee aggregativity is false. Paseau and Saunders's mistaken assertion can be understood as arising from a neglect of the (cooperative) games approach to fair division. Our treatment has two further payoffs: for one, we give an accessible introduction to the (cooperative) games approach to fair division, whose significance has hitherto not been appreciated by philosophers working on fairness. For another, our discussion explores the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems in a comprehensive fashion.

“…Broome is thus quite non-committal about the notion of proportionality, and his theory does not offer an actual method that describes 'how to be fair'. In response to this, Curtis (2014) has provided a new theory of fairness that spells out what he maintains Broome's (1990) theory has left out.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to be fairer

Wintein

2015

Synthese

We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis (in Analysis 74:417-57, 2014) is not implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome's (in Proc Aristot Soc 91:87-101, 1990) notion of claims is too restrictive and that game-theoretic approaches can rectify this shortcoming. More generally, we argue that axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics is an indispensable ingredient of any theorizing about fair division problems and allocative justice.