2008
DOI: 10.1007/s10551-008-9722-3
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TNC Motives for Signing International Framework Agreements: A Continuous Bargaining Model of Stakeholder Pressure

Abstract: Over the past decade, discussion has flourished among practitioners and academics regarding workers' rights in developing countries. The lack of enforcement of national labour laws and the limited protection of workers' rights in developing countries have led workers' rights representatives to attempt to establish transnational industrial relations systems to complement existing national systems. In practice, these attempts have mainly been operationalised in unilateral codes of conduct; recently, however, neg… Show more

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Cited by 45 publications
(21 citation statements)
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“…However, institutional thickness is a double-edged sword in a cross-border setting like the IFA negotiations we examine. On the one hand, the rather thick regulatory environment of European labour relations provides for access to the bargaining table (Egels-Zandén, 2009). On the other hand, these regulations may restrict the range of solutions negotiators can think of, leading to negotiation outcomes that are difficult to translate and enact for local actors constrained by different institutions.…”
Section: Institutional Context and Logicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, institutional thickness is a double-edged sword in a cross-border setting like the IFA negotiations we examine. On the one hand, the rather thick regulatory environment of European labour relations provides for access to the bargaining table (Egels-Zandén, 2009). On the other hand, these regulations may restrict the range of solutions negotiators can think of, leading to negotiation outcomes that are difficult to translate and enact for local actors constrained by different institutions.…”
Section: Institutional Context and Logicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Regarding the first of these three research areas, there is ample research into why firms adopt codes of conduct (e.g., Weaver, 1993;Esbenshade, 2001;van Tulder and Kolk, 2001;Bondy et al, 2004;Graafland, 2004), and some emerging research into why firms adopt IFAs (Miller, 2004;Riisgaard, 2005;Egels-Zandén, 2008a). There is also some research into why labour unions prefer IFAs (Justice, 2003;Frundt, 2004;Miller, 2004;Lipschutz, 2004;Roman, 2004;Riisgaard, 2005); existing research, however, provides few answers as to why NGOs promote codes rather than IFAs.…”
Section: Intra-organisational Aspectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, it is reasonable to expect that IFAs might be more effective than codes of conduct in promoting union rights, given the influential role of unions in negotiating and implementing IFAs (cf. Wills, 2002;Riisgaard, 2005;Egels-Zandén, 2008a). Union rights is also an area in which codes of conduct have had limited success (Barrientos and Smith, 2007;EgelsZandén and Hyllman, 2007).…”
Section: Intra-organisational Aspectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…IFAs and codes of conduct may serve a similar purpose, namely, to improve and protect workers' rights, but the governance system of IFAs is different and does not simply lay in the hands or control of the business enterprise. The system of governance attached to IFAs recognizes and implants the role of trade unions in representing and promoting workers' rights (Egels-Zandén, 2008). There is just one IFA in the banana sector, which was signed in 2001 by Chiquita Brands International, the IUF and the Central American trade union Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Bananeros (COLSIBA) (IUF, 2001).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%